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Deciding what is possible is an essential human ability, and our judgments about possibility 
often appear effortless and straightforward. But how do we actually decide whether something is 
possible or impossible? This dissertation explores two strategies that children might use to infer 
the possibility of strange or improbable events. The first posits that children think about the 
causal circumstances that could enable an event when judging whether it could happen. The 
second instead suggests that children’s inferences about possibility are guided by a memory-
based heuristic that compares potential events to known events. Children’s (N = 1,068) use of 
these strategies are explored across three papers. Chapter 2 investigated 4- to 7-year-old’s beliefs 
about the possibility of improbable events and impossible events in dreams and stories, finding 
that children judged more events to be possible in these fantastical worlds than in real life. 
However, across all worlds children more often judged improbable events possible than 
impossible events, and children only affirmed impossible events if the events were especially 
dream- or story-like. The findings suggest that children’s beliefs about fantastical worlds are 
partly constrained by their real-world intuitions, and partly driven by what they know to have 
occurred in each kind of world. Chapter 3 explored whether 4- to 6-year-old children use a 
memory-based similarity heuristic to infer possibility, in which events are judged possible if they 
are similar to a known event. The findings provide evidence for a similarity heuristic in 5- and 6-
year-olds possibility judgments: children judged similar improbable events possible, but did not 
affirm dissimilar improbable events or similar impossible events. Finally, Chapter 4 examined 
whether providing 4- to 7-year-old children with information about enabling causal 
circumstances would lead them to affirm the possibility of improbable events. It also contrasted 
the effect of this kind of causal information with information about similar events. The findings 
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show that causal information alone did little to alter children’s beliefs about possibility. 
However, the findings again show evidence for a similarity heuristic in 5- and 6-year-olds 
possibility judgments, as children more often affirmed improbable events if they were first told 
about a similar event. Further, this study provides tentative evidence that a combination of 
enabling causal knowledge and information about a similar event has the greatest positive impact 
on children’s possibility judgments for improbable events. Together, this work suggests that our 
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Chapter One: General Introduction 
“If we call prodigies or miracles whatever our reason cannot reach, how many of these 
appear continually to our eyes! Let us consider through what clouds and how gropingly 
we are led to the knowledge of most of the things that are right in our hands; assuredly 
we shall find that it is rather familiarity than knowledge that takes away their 
strangeness…” 
—Michel de Montaigne 
Determining what's possible is an essential human ability, and something we often do 
without much effort. We look for doors because we know we cannot walk through walls; we 
avoid running into traffic because we know we are not immortal; we prepare for tomorrow but 
believe we can never revisit yesterday; we speak our thoughts aloud because we know our minds 
are private and inaccessible. Each of these judgments reflect everyday behaviours that show a 
clear orientation towards the possible over the impossible. 
Such distinctions often seem easy to intuit, but not all possibility judgments are so 
straightforward—and the consequences of mistaken possibility judgments can be severe. 
Sometimes we are unable to see possibilities—or dismiss them as impossibilities—and therefore 
fail to adequately anticipate the future. People have confidently bet against the possibility of 
radio signals crossing the Atlantic Ocean, flying machines ever leaving the ground, and the 
viability of nuclear energy—only to be proved wrong within their lifetimes (“Keep up”, 1893; 
Foresight Institute, 2021). On the other hand, we sometimes mistake impossibilities for 
possibilities, and waste time and resources working towards unattainable goals. For instance, the 
field of alchemy spent centuries working towards the discovery of a substance that could turn 
lead into gold, despite this being atomically impossible (Matson, 2014). And many inventors 
worked tirelessly towards the creation of a functional perpetual motion machine, despite the 
machine’s mere existence being a clear violation of the laws of thermodynamics (Angrist, 1967). 
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We also use others’ ability to distinguish between possible and impossible events as an 
especially important social cue. For instance, imagine a friend calls you on the phone to tell you 
they see people with the bodies of horses and objects levitating above the ground. You cannot be 
certain about what is actually happening around them, but you might reasonably worry that your 
friend is hallucinating since the things they are perceiving cannot be real. Further, imagine your 
doctor casually informs you that they believe the earth is flat and that cell phone towers serve to 
exert power over our thoughts. You might begin to seriously question the quality of the care you 
are receiving, since your doctor clearly struggles to use available evidence to figure out what is 
really going on. Even young children are skeptical of claims made by people who appear to have 
a faulty view of reality (Harris et al., 2018; Sobel & Kushnir, 2013). We usually do not expect 
people to come to unique conclusions about possibility, and any surprising conclusions we do 
encounter often signal misperception, faulty reasoning, or even trickery.  
But how do we infer what’s possible and impossible? One might expect that our beliefs 
about possibility are driven by a rich understanding of how the world works, and knowledge of 
the deeper principles that render certain outcomes possible or impossible (Schult & Wellman, 
1997; Sobel, 2004). Despite often seeming effortless and ubiquitous in nature, possibility 
judgments appear to rely on an understanding of disparate domains of knowledge. Our belief that 
we can never walk through walls or fall upwards seems to indicate knowledge of physics. We 
also know that cats can never birth puppies or transform into tigers, which appears to reflect an 
understanding of biology. And we know that days can never last forever or pass more slowly in 
some places than others, which suggests a basic grasp of the properties of time. But these 
judgments may be less disparate, and less principled, than they seem. 
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This dissertation seeks to investigate possibility judgment as a domain-general 
phenomenon. It explores simple strategies that we may deploy when reasoning about the 
possibility of events in diverse domains, rather than addressing how our understanding of 
different domains or processes might shape our beliefs. Here, I test two separate accounts that 
broadly explain how children and adults may reason about possibility. The first posits that we 
consult our knowledge of how events might happen before deciding whether they can or cannot. 
For instance, before deciding whether giraffes can possibly swim, we might consider the 
awkward size and shape of the animal and whether its limbs could reasonably propel its weight 
upwards and forwards. The second proposes that we use our memories of what has happened as 
a direct jumping off point for our inferences about possibility. For instance, we might just 
remember that elephants, hippos, and zebras can swim, and decide that giraffes can probably 
swim, too. 
While this work serves as the first to test these accounts directly, the accounts themselves 
are not entirely new. They have been proposed, in one form or another, in previous work on 
beliefs about possibility, though solid evidence in favour of either remains weak or absent 
entirely (see Shtulman & Carey, 2007; Woolley & Ghossainy, 2013). They were also raised 
much earlier by Michel de Montaigne, who penned an essay in the 16th century addressing two 
very similar accounts for inferring possibility. Regarding how we come to understand which 
events are possible rather than impossible, he asserted that “assuredly we shall find that it is 
rather familiarity than knowledge that takes away their strangeness” (Montaigne, 1958). Here, I 
will argue that I find just that.  
Before further outlining these two accounts, though, it is essential to explain my approach 
to understanding possibility, and why it is informative. While my work aims to pinpoint general 
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mechanisms that enable reasoning about possibility, the studies in this dissertation solely explore 
the beliefs of young children rather than adults. Specifically, my work seeks to understand how 
beliefs about possibility develop over time, and to identify the kinds of information that drive 
belief revision. This is a fruitful approach to understanding how we reason about possibility, as it 
allows me to test manipulations that may serve to foster more mature reasoning among children, 
thereby pinpointing the mechanisms that shape adults’ beliefs. And it is especially fruitful 
because children’s and adults’ beliefs about possibility differ so dramatically. 
A naïve reader might expect this difference to involve diminishing credulity: young 
children believe that almost anything is possible, and only grow to realize that some outcomes 
are actually impossible as they learn more about how the world works. However, that reader will 
be surprised to learn that the complete opposite is true: children are remarkably skeptical about 
the possibility of events. Below, I describe the recent body of developmental work that shows 
how children's beliefs about possibility differ markedly from those of adults, and how these 
findings have contributed to our understanding of possibility judgment. 
What do children think is possible? 
Could a person find an alligator under their bed, grow a beard down to their toes, or drink 
onion juice? The truth is that these events are possible, albeit highly strange and improbable. 
Adults acknowledge this, and affirm that such things are as possible as completely ordinary 
events, like washing a car or wearing a baseball cap. However, young children feel differently. 
When 4- to 6-year-olds are asked these questions, they usually say the events cannot happen. 
Indeed, 4-year-olds have been found to deny them almost as often as truly impossible events, 
such as walking through a brick wall or travelling through time (Shtulman & Carey, 2007). 
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This finding is robust: young children usually deny the possibility of any strange and 
improbable event. This pattern of responding has emerged across different study designs and test 
questions (Bowman-Smith et al., 2019; Cook & Sobel, 2011; Danovich & Lane, 2020; Lane et 
al., 2016; 2018; Nancekivell & Friedman, 2017; Nolan-Reyes et al., 2016; Shtulman & Phillips, 
2018), including questions that span multiple domains of knowledge (biology, physics, 
psychology; Shtulman. 2009). For instance, children not only reject the possibility of people 
engaging in strange behaviours (Shutlman, 2009; Shtulman & Carey, 2007), but also the 
possibility of strange and unfamiliar machines like motion detectors and voice changers (Cook & 
Sobel, 2011). They also continue to deny improbable events when someone tells them that they 
experienced the event firsthand or heard about the event from someone else (Lane et al., 2018), 
and they deny claims about improbable events learned from books or the internet (Danovich & 
Lane, 2020). They even deny improbable events after being asked to imagine the events 
occurring, even if they are successful at imagining them (Lane et al., 2016). Overall, their beliefs 
about improbable events are remarkably consistent, and appear resistant against manipulations 
that seek to change them. 
However, it is worth noting that children can differentiate improbable events from 
impossible events when asked to explicitly differentiate between the two (Shtulman & Carey, 
2007; Weisberg & Sobel, 2012). For instance, Shtulman & Carey (2007) provided children with 
a “possible” box and “impossible” box and asked them to sort improbable and impossible events 
into the appropriate boxes. Here, children overwhelmingly sorted improbable events as 
“possible” and impossible events as “impossible”, despite denying these same events in earlier 
experiments. In another study by Weisberg & Sobel (2012), children were heard a story filled 
with either improbable or impossible events and were asked to select pages to continue the story. 
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On each test trial, children were offered a page that had either improbable events or a page that 
had impossible events. Despite denying that all of these events were possible, children mostly 
selected the pages with events that matched the story; they chose improbable events for the 
improbable story, and impossible events for the improbable story. Finally, across all studies of 
children’s beliefs about possibility children are almost always more likely to deny impossible 
than improbable events, despite mostly denying both. Together, these findings suggest that 
children represent improbability and impossibility differently. Yet very few studies show 
children outright affirming the possibility of improbable events—they mostly deny them instead. 
This finding is analogous to children's reasoning about atypical events and behaviors in 
other domains. Children typically deny the possibility of events or objects that deviate from 
established social norms (Kalish, 1998; Komatsu & Galotti, 1986; Levy et al., 1995; Lockhart et 
al., 1977; Miller et al., 2000). For instance, they judge that a person could not wear pajamas to 
the grocery store (Browne & Woolley, 2004), and deny that school buses could be any color 
other than yellow (Cimpian & Steinberg, 2014). They also judge that people cannot choose to 
perform atypical actions or initiate atypical events, such as eating dinner alone rather than with 
their family (Chernyak et al., 2019). These findings may be partly driven by children's failure to 
distinguish between things that should happen (i.e., judgments about moral obligations) and 
things that could happen (i.e., true possibility judgments; Shtulman & Phillips, 2018). However, 
this failure cannot fully explain how children reason about possibility across the board, as they 
readily deny the possibility of amoral events that do not involve choice (e.g., finding an alligator 
under your bed, getting struck by lightning). Together, these findings highlight a general 
aversion among young children towards affirming atypical events and behaviors. 
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Surprisingly, similar patterns of judgment also emerge when children are asked to reason 
about fantastical worlds and events. While children can readily distinguish between reality and 
fantasy from at least age 5 (Boerger, 2011; Corriveau et al., 2009; Samuels & Taylor, 1994; 
Woolley & Ghossainy, 2013), their reasoning about fantasy appears remarkably reality-bound 
and mundane. For instance, when children are asked to select the next page in a clearly magical 
story, they prefer to select a page describing normal events over a page that fits the magical 
theme (Weisberg et al., 2013). They also usually offer mundane explanations for magical and 
impossible phenomena; they say that unicorns come from pet stores, and that beards as tall as 
towers were probably just grown to be that way (Nancekivell & Friedman, 2017; Woolley & 
Cornelius, 2017). Further, children report struggling to even imagine phenomena that cannot 
occur in the real world (Lane et al., 2016). In sum, children appear to have a global bias against 
affirming any event that is outside the norm—even when these events are embedded in patently 
unrealistic contexts. 
How can we explain children's possibility judgments, and why they differ so drastically 
from those of adults? Below, I revisit the two potential strategies outlined above and look more 
closely at how they might operate. Importantly, these strategies may be used by both children 
and adults alike, and teasing them apart may help us better understand the mechanisms 
underlying the developmental shift outlined above. Also note that while these accounts are not 
mutually exclusive, they each make unique predictions regarding how beliefs about possibility 






How could this happen? The causal-circumstances account 
One way that children and adults might reason about possibility is by attempting to 
identify how events could occur. Specifically, they might seek to identify circumstances that 
would enable an event, only affirming events as possible if they succeed. For instance, people 
might affirm that a person could find an alligator under their bed if they decide that it could have 
crawled unseen through an open door or window. On this view, adults usually affirm the 
possibility of improbable events because they succeed at identifying circumstances that would 
enable them. Conversely, children usually deny the possibility of improbable events because they 
cannot think of any circumstances that would allow the event to occur. 
This account has been favored in previous work on possibility judgment (Lane et al., 
2016; Shtulman, 2009; Shtulman & Carey, 2007), and some evidence in support of the account 
can be found in how children and adults justify their beliefs. Adults often offer factual 
justifications, or justifications that identify circumstances that would enable an event (or the 
absence of such circumstances). Factual justifications essentially offer principles that would 
enable or disable outcomes. For instances, when asked if a person could live without a 
functioning heart, adults might deny the event with the justification that "You need a heart to 
pump blood" (Shtulman, 2009). Justifications pointing to causal circumstances instead aim to 
explain how the event might occur. For instance, an adult might state that a person could live 
without a heart if some alternative mechanism could pump their blood instead (Shtulman & 
Tong, 2013). Conversely, children usually offer neither of these kinds of justifications. Instead, 
they often respond hypothetically (e.g., a person without a heart would die), or redundantly (e.g., 
because you can't live without a heart; Shtulman, 2009). Taken at face value, these justifications 




Figure 1. The two proposed strategies for inferring possibility. The causal-circumstances 
account proposes that people judge possibility by trying to think of circumstances that might 
allow events to happen. The memory-based similarity account proposes that people judge 
possibility by searching their memories for instances of similar events that have already 
occurred. 
 
This causal-circumstances account might also explain how children reason about norm violations 
and fantasy. Regarding norm violations, children might not be able to envision how such 
violations could occur; for instance, they might know little about how a school bus could come 
to be painted differently. Regarding fantastical worlds, children might default to reasoning about 
how events could happen in the real world even when confronted with clearly fantastical events 
and contexts. Indeed, this account has been offered as an explanation for why children report 
failing to even imagine extraordinary events—they simply cannot envision how the events could 
happen (Lane et al., 2016). 
Has anything like this happened before? The memory-based similarity account 
Alternatively, people may reason about the possibility of events by searching for 
memories of similar events that they know to have happened in the past, only affirming events if 
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they can recall that something similar has already occurred. For instance, people might affirm 
that a person could find an alligator under their bed if they can recall instances of alligators being 
unexpectedly found in people's kitchens or bathrooms. This strategy does not require any 
knowledge of how outcomes might be enabled. Instead, it is akin to the use of an availability 
heuristic that searches for similar events rather than exact instances of the event in question 
(Bowman-Smith et al., 2019; Tversky & Kahneman, 1973). On this view, adults affirm 
improbable events because they have more memories to call on, or because they are better at 
retrieving relevant memories (see Levy & Anderson, 2002). Conversely, children fail because 
they do not know of similar events or are less able to retrieve them. 
Note that this account differs from a mere-familiarity account, in which events are judged 
possible if they are already known (Woolley & Ghossainy, 2013). Previous work addressed 
whether mere familiarity could account for children and adults' beliefs about improbable events 
by asking whether they had already heard of the events in question. It could not—both groups 
had never heard of pickle-flavored ice-cream or alligators under beds, yet children denied these 
events while adults affirmed them (Shtulman, 2009; Shtulman & Carey, 2007). But the present 
similarity account instead only requires that a sufficiently similar event be identified, regardless 
of the familiarity of the target event. 
While this account has little direct support, there are reasons to believe that it can explain 
previous findings better than a purely causal account. For instance, children judge events as more 
possible in distant lands than in the place they live (Bowman-Smith et al., 2019). It seems 
unlikely that children are somehow more familiar with how events might happen in distant lands 
than at home, so they may instead feel less confident in their memories when reasoning about 
unfamiliar events in unfamiliar places. Further, adults often judge possible certain events that are 
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currently impossible, such as performing a brain transplant or traversing the Milky Way 
(Shtulman & Tong, 2013). The circumstances that could enable these events are simply not 
known, so it is unlikely that adults' judgments are driven by knowledge of how they could 
happen. Instead, adults may affirm them because they appear similar to known events, such as 
performing a heart transplant or travelling to the Moon. 
This similarity account can also explain children's beliefs about norm violations. Children 
may deny such violations for the same reason they deny improbable events: they have no 
memories of similar violations occurring. For instance, they may only know of yellow school 
buses, so they infer that buses must be yellow. This account may also help explain how children 
reason about fantasy. Children's reality-bound reasoning towards fantastical worlds and events 
may reflect a general bias towards familiar events, as children call upon their memories of what 
they know to have happened in reality. This could explain why they prefer to insert ordinary 
events into fantastical stories, and why they offer mundane explanations for impossible and 
extraordinary events. 
Overview of Dissertation 
The following three chapters advance our understanding of children's beliefs about 
possibility by adjudicating between the causal-circumstances account and memory-based 
similarity account of possibility judgment. Together, these chapters will report the results of 
eight experiments, in which I tested 1,068 children aged 4 to 7. Chapter 2 tests the limits of the 
causal-circumstances account by probing children’s beliefs about the possibility of events in 
dreams and stories. Chapter 3 directly tests for the presence of a memory-based similarity 
heuristic in children's possibility judgments. Finally, Chapter 4 investigates whether knowledge 
of enabling causal circumstances leads children to affirm that improbable events are possible. 
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Are children reality-prone when reasoning about fantastical worlds? 
Chapter 2 investigates children's beliefs about the possibility of improbable and 
impossible events across dreams, stories, and reality. In the first experiment, 4- to 6-year-olds 
were simply asked whether different improbable events and impossible events could happen in a 
dream or real life. The second experiment builds on the first by asking 4- to 7-year-olds whether 
the same kinds of events are possible in a dream or a story. In the third and final experiment, 
children were asked whether dream- and story-like impossible events could happen in a dream, a 
story, and reality. 
This series of experiments provides insight into whether children hold nuanced beliefs 
about different fantastical worlds, and whether their reasoning about these worlds mirrors their 
understanding of the real world. It also provides insight into how children reason about 
possibility in general, as the findings point to mechanisms that may drive global inferences of 
possibility across contexts. Specially, this chapter explores whether children’s beliefs about 
fantasy are in line with the causal-circumstances account, as this account predicts that judgments 
for events fantastical worlds should reflect intuitions about how events might occur in reality. 
Do children use a memory-based similarity heuristic to infer possibility? 
Chapter 3 directly investigates whether children rely on their knowledge of 
what has happened to determine what can happen. In the first experiment, 4- to 6-year-olds were 
told either improbable or ordinary facts and asked whether related improbable events can 
happen. In the second experiment, 5- and 6-year-olds were asked whether the same events are 
possible after hearing either related or unrelated improbable facts. In the third experiment, 5- and 
6-year-olds were told improbable facts before judging whether related improbable and 
impossible could happen. 
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Together, these findings speak to two important aspects of children's reasoning about 
possibility. First, they show whether children will affirm improbable events as possible if they 
know of a similar event—even if the circumstances that could enable these events remain 
mysterious or unclear. Second, they probe the extent to which children are willing to deploy this 
heuristic by testing whether their judgments are constrained by knowledge of deeper principles 
rendering certain outcomes impossible. 
Are children's beliefs about possibility explained by limitations in causal knowledge? 
Chapter 4 turns to the causal-circumstances account for possibility inferences, and tests 
whether children will affirm improbable events as possible if they are told how they might 
happen. In Experiment 1, 4- to 7-year-olds were told either causal or noncausal information 
about ordinary events before being asked whether related ordinary events, improbable events, 
and impossible events could happen. In Experiment 2, 5- and 6-year-olds were told either 1) how 
ordinary events could happen, 2) how improbable events could happen, or 3) merely the fact that 
an improbable event occurred. 
These findings directly address the role of enabling causal information in children's 
possibility judgments. They also explore the relative influence of causal information and 
knowledge of similar events, providing insight into how these strategies jointly work to shape 




Chapter Two: Children’s beliefs about possibility in dreams and stories are constrained by 
their beliefs about reality (Paper One) 
A version of this paper is published: 
Goulding, B. W. & Friedman, O. (2020). Children’s beliefs about possibility differ across 
dreams, stories, and reality. Child Development, 91(6), 1843-1835. 
https://doi.org/10.1111/cdev.13386 
 
It is impossible for a person to soar through the air unaided by modern technology, or to 
gain and use magical powers. Yet many people experience these events firsthand, as both are 
common in the dreams of adults around the world (e.g., Canada, Germany, and China; see 
Nielsen et al., 2003; Schredl, Ciric, Götz, & Wittmann, 2004; and Yu, 2008 respectively). People 
regularly encounter these events in worlds of fiction as well. Some of the highest grossing books 
and films of all time (e.g., Harry Potter, The Avengers) feature characters that fly and use magic, 
and do so amidst a flurry of other equally reality-defying events. Adults easily affirm that such 
events are possible in dreams and fiction, but impossible in real life. This shows that adults hold 
restricted beliefs that are specific to the particular world (real, dream, or fictional) under 
consideration.  
It is unclear, though, whether younger children also consider the world in which an event 
is embedded (dream, story, reality) when determining if it can occur in that world. Here we 
contrast two theoretical perspectives. One is that children are reality-prone and judge similar 
things to be possible in dreams, stories and reality. Children’s knowledge of familiar real events 
is believed to make them skeptical about counterintuitive entities and events (Shutlman, 2009; 
Shtulman & Carey, 2007), and constrains their reasoning about fiction (e.g., Sobel & Weisberg, 
2014; Weisberg, Sobel, Goodstein, & Bloom, 2013), their enactment of pretense (e.g., Van de 
Vondervoort & Friedman, 2017), and even their imaginations (e.g., Lane, Ronfard, Francioli, & 
Harris, 2016). So perhaps children’s knowledge of familiar real events also limits their beliefs 
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about what is possible in dreams and stories. This theoretical perspective is inspired by Lane et 
al.’s (2016) causal constraints account, which contends that children often fail to imagine events 
when they are unaware of a causal mechanism that would enable it to occur.  
 The other perspective is that children consider the world in which an event occurs, and 
judge different events to be possible in fantasy worlds than in the real world. Differing 
judgments across worlds would show that children are not wholly constrained by their real-world 
knowledge when reasoning about fantastical worlds. It would also further demonstrate that 
children consider environment and context when deciding if an event is possible (Bowman-
Smith, Shtulman, & Friedman, 2019; Dias & Harris, 1988; Richards & Sanderson, 1999). 
Children as Reality-Prone Reasoners 
We know that children are highly conservative in their judgments about what is possible 
in the real world. They deny the possibility of not only impossible events, but improbable events 
as well. For 4-year-olds, having a pet lion is almost as impossible as walking through a brick 
wall, while for adults it is almost as possible as wearing a baseball cap. Children adopt broader 
beliefs about whether events are possible as they age, but it is not until adulthood that people 
largely accept that improbable events can happen (Shtulman & Carey, 2007). This pattern of 
findings has proven robust (Cook & Sobel, 2011; Lane, Ronfard, & El-Sherif, 2018; Lane, 
Ronfard, Francioli, & Harris, 2016; Nancekivell & Friedman, 2017; Nolan-Reyes, Callanan, & 
Haigh, 2016; Shtulman, 2009; Shtulman & Phillips, 2018; Weisberg & Sobel, 2012).  
Children’s bias towards reality-prone reasoning may leave them insensitive to the world 
in which an event occurs. Children use their real-world causal knowledge to judge that some 
unfamiliar events are not possible (Schult & Wellman, 1997; Sobel, 2004; Cook & Sobel, 2011; 
Shutlman & Carey, 2007; Shutlman, 2009). But they might likewise use this knowledge to judge 
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these events cannot happen in stories and dreams. This would lead to possibility judgments that 
are similar across reality and fantasy. Broadly consistent with this, children are often reality-
prone when reasoning about fantastical worlds. Whereas adults often continue an overtly 
fantastical story with more fantastical events, children instead continue the story with realistic 
events (Weisberg et al., 2013). Children offer realistic explanations for fantastical events (e.g., 
buying a pet unicorn at a pet store), despite also believing that the events are impossible 
(Nancekivell & Friedman, 2017). Even when asked to simply close their eyes and imagine an 
impossible event (e.g., walking through a brick wall), children often report that they are unable 
to do so, or that they imagined a possible event instead (e.g., walking around a brick wall; Lane 
et al., 2016). Together, these findings suggest that children might apply realistic principles 
indiscriminately across realistic and fantastical contexts.  
Children as Differentiators Between Reality and Fantasy 
Alternatively, children’s judgments about what is possible may vary across worlds, and 
may be less conservative when the events are framed as occurring in a fantasy world rather than 
reality. Despite their tendency towards reality-prone reasoning, children draw a firm distinction 
between reality and fantasy (Samuels & Taylor, 1994; Woolley & Ghossainy, 2013). For 
example, from age 5 children judge characters who perform impossible feats to be fictional, 
rather than from history (Corriveau, Kim, Schwalen, & Harris, 2009), and from age 6, children 
judge that fantastical characters are more likely to perform acts that violate real-world causal 
principles (e.g., walking through a wall instead of using a door) than real people (Boerger, 2011). 
Further, children are less likely to view an antisocial event (e.g., kicking a friend) as 
unacceptable when it occurs in a fantastical context as compared to real life (Fast & Van Reet, 
2018). So, while children may exhibit more reality-prone reasoning than adults, they do not 
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expect real and fantastical worlds to mirror each other. They may therefore accept that even 
impossible events can occur in fantastical worlds, while denying that improbable events can 
occur in the real world. 
Previous work has shown that children show some appreciation that impossible events 
can be dreamt or imagined. For instance, Wellman & Estes (1986) and Woolley & Wellman 
(1992) found that 3- to 5-year-olds believed that they could both think and dream about 
impossible events such as a pencil that cries or an apple that dances. Importantly, however, all 
but one of the events featured anthropomorphism, and children may more readily accept 
anthropomorphic events than other violations of their real-world knowledge (Van de 
Vondervoort & Friedman, 2017; also see Lane, Wellman, & Evans, 2010). Indeed, this may 
explain why children accepted the possibility of thinking and dreaming about anthropomorphic 
impossible events, whereas Lane et al. (2016) found that children could not even visualize other 
impossible events. 
We tested between these alternative theories in three experiments. Experiment 1 
compares children’s possibility judgments in reality and dreams; Experiment 2 compares 




Participants. We first asked 90 children about whether events could occur in dreams: 30 
4-year-olds (M = 4;5 [years;months], range = 4;0-4;11, 16 girls), 30 5-year-olds (M = 5;5, range 
= 5;0-5;11, 14 girls), and 30 6-year-olds (M = 6;5, range = 6;0-6;11, 17 girls). We then asked a 
further 90 children whether the same events could occur in reality: 30 4-year-olds (M = 4;8, 
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range = 4;3-4;11, 10 girls), 30 5-year-olds (M = 5;5, range = 5;0-5;11, 13 girls), and 30 6-year-
olds (M = 6;3, range = 6;0-6;9, 15 girls). One additional child did not respond to the questions 
and was therefore replaced.  
For all experiments, we sought to test 30 children per age-in-years per between-subject 
condition; this number was in keeping with our lab-wide stopping rule when these data were 
collected. Children were recruited and individually tested at childcare centers and elementary 
schools. Demographics were not formally collected, but most children were from middle-class 
families in the region of Waterloo (Ontario, Canada). Approximately 85% of residents in this 
region are Caucasian, and the largest visible minority groups are of Chinese and South Asian 
descent. All studies received approval from the Office of Research Ethics at the University of 
Waterloo. 
Materials and procedure. In all experiments, children heard descriptions of events that 
were each accompanied by a related photo shown on a laptop computer; see Figure 2 for all 
events and photos. For the dream condition, children were first asked if they were familiar with 
dreams (“Do you ever have dreams? And do you ever remember your dreams?”). Children then 
heard about twelve events and judged if the events could happen in a dream (“I’m going to tell 
you a bunch of things, and I want to know if they could happen in a dream. OK?”). We asked 
about three types of events (with four events per type): improbable events (e.g., “In a dream, 
could a person have a pet peacock?”), physically impossible events, hereafter called 
“impossible” events (e.g., “…walk through a brick wall?”), and logically impossible events, 
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hereafter called “illogical” events (e.g., “…draw a circle that’s also a square?”). 1 Events were 
presented in one of two pseudorandom orders.  
Figure 2. Events and pictures from all experiments (starred items were not included in 
Experiment 2). Events are arranged in one of two trial orders. Also in Experiment 3, children 
were asked about each world in one of three orders: dream, story, reality; reality, story, dream; 
story, reality, dream. 
 
1 Our main interest was in children’s judgments about improbable and impossible events. However, we included 
illogical events as a precaution to rule out a possible “yes” bias, in case children always affirmed that impossible 
events could happen in dreams.  
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The procedure for the reality context was identical, except the inquiry about dreams was 
excluded, and children were instead asked whether the events could happen in “real life” (e.g., 
“I’m going to tell you a bunch of things, and I want to know if they could happen in real life… In 
real life, could a person have a pet peacock?”). 
Results and Discussion 
In all experiments, the main analyses used Generalized Estimating Equations models 
(binary logistic) with independent covariance matrices. We first report the effects of world and 
event-type, and follow with effects of age. For further clarity, we also report single-sample tests 
against chance; see Table 1. The data for all experiments is available here. 
We entered world (dream, reality), event-type (improbable, impossible, illogical), and 
age (4, 5, 6) as predictors of children’s possibility judgments. We found a main effect of world, 
Wald χ2(1) = 48.00, p < .001, as children believed more events could happen in a dream than in 
reality, ps < .001. We also found a main effect of event-type, Wald χ2(2) = 80.56, p < .001, as 
children judged that more improbable events could happen than impossible or illogical events, ps 
< .005. However, these effects were qualified by an interaction, Wald χ2(2) = 18.20, p < .001; see 
Figure 3. For dreams, children judged that more improbable events could happen than impossible 
or illogical events, ps < .001, but judged that a similar number of impossible and illogical events 
could happen, p = .197. For reality, children again judged that more improbable events could 
happen than impossible or illogical events, ps ≤ .005, but also judged that more illogical events 
could happen than impossible events, p = .003. 
 The main effect of age was only marginally significant, Wald χ2(2) = 4.73, p = .094, 
though we found a significant interaction between age and event-type, Wald χ2(4) = 12.78, p = 
.012; see Figure 4. At all ages, children judged that more improbable events could happen than 
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impossible events, ps < .001. However, only 5- and 6-year-olds judged that more improbable 
events could happen than illogical events, ps ≤ .007, Also, whereas 4-year-olds judged that a  
similar number of improbable and illogical events could happen, p = .176, 5- and 6-year-olds 
judged that more improbable than illogical events could happen, ps ≤ .007 . The interaction 
between age and context was only marginally significant, p = .070, as was the 3-way interaction 
between context, event type and age, p = .097, so we do not consider them further. 
 
 
Figure 3. Flat violin plot showing the proportion of improbable, impossible, and illogical events 
children judged possible in dreams and reality (Experiment 1). Dots and whiskers show means 
and 95% confidence intervals. 
 
 Single sample tests against chance showed that 5- and 6-year-olds mostly agreed that 
improbable events could happen in dreams, ps ≤ .033, and that children at all ages mostly 
disagreed that any event could happen in reality, ps ≤ .049. No other judgments differed from 
chance, ps ≥ .096; see Table 1 for all comparisons. 
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Table 1. Single-sample tests against chance for children’s judgments in Experiments 1 and 2. 
The table shows means with standard deviations in parentheses, followed by p-values for each 
comparison. 
 
Experiment World Event 4-year-olds 5-year-olds 6-year-olds 7-year-olds 
1 Dream Improbable .60 (.49) .148 .63 (.49) .033 .66 (.48) .036     
    Impossible .40 (.49) .216 .39 (.49) .096 .45 (.50) .545     
    Illogical .53 (.50) .662 .42 (.50) .176 .44 (.50) .405     
  Reality Improbable .39 (.49) .049 .30 (.46) .001 .33 (.47)  001     
    Impossible .17 (.38) <.001 .10 (.30) <.001 .02 (.13) <.001     
    Illogical .36 (.48) .031 .23 (.42) <.001 .20 (.40) <.001     
2 Dream Improbable .56 (.50) .345 .44 (.50) .425 .71 (.46) .001 .77 (.43) .001 
    Impossible .39 (.49) .088 .33 (.47) .037 .48 (.50) 780  .72 (.45) .008 
    Illogical .46 (.50) .577 .31 (.47) .008 .26 (.44) .004 .42 (.50) .357 
  Story Improbable .41 (.49) .175 .49 (.50) .934 .43 (.50) .338 .67 (.47) .023 
    Impossible .22 (.42) .001 .21 (.41) <.001 .19 (.39) <.001 .41 (.49) .303 





Figure 4. Bar plot showing the proportion of improbable, impossible, and illogical events judged 
possible by children at each age. The plot shows children’s judgments collapsed across dreams 
and reality. Whiskers show 95% confidence intervals. 
 
 These findings show that children do not reason realistically about what can happen in a 
dream. Instead, they also consider the world in which the event occurs. However, it is unclear 
whether children’s judgments in Experiment 1 reflect beliefs specific to dreams, or instead 
reflect general beliefs about possibility in fantastical or unreal worlds. In Experiment 2, we 
explore this by comparing children’s judgments about possibility in the fantastical worlds of 
dreams and stories.  
Experiment 2 
Method 
 Participants. We tested 229 children. For the dream condition, we tested 30 4-year-olds 
(M = 4;7, range = 4;1-4;11, 12 girls), 30 5-year-olds (M = 5;7, range = 5;1-5;11, 14 girl), 30 6-
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year-olds (M = 6;6, range = 6;1-6;11, 11 girls), and 26 7-year-olds (M = 7;3, range = 7;0-7;11, 
13 girls). For the story condition, we tested 30 4-year-olds (M = 4;8, range = 4;1-4;11, 17 girls), 
30 5-year-olds (M = 4;7, range = 5;0-5;11, 18 girls), 30 6-year-olds (M = 6;6, range = 6;0-6;11, 
13 girls), and 23 7-year-olds (M = 7;3, range = 7;0-7;11, 12 girls).  Children were randomly 
assigned to either the dream or story condition. As noted above, we aimed to test 30 children per 
cell. However, we were unable to do so for 7-year-olds before ending data collection for the 
season.  
 Materials and procedure. The procedure was similar to Experiment 1. Children judged 
whether three kinds of events (improbable, impossible, illogical) could happen in one of two 
worlds: in a dream, or in a story. Children were first asked if they were familiar with the given 
world (“Do you know about dreams, like dreams you have when you’re asleep?”; “Do you know 
about stories, like stories in books?”). They then heard about nine events, each accompanied by a 
related photo, and judged whether the event could happen in the given world. Events were 
presented in one of two pseudorandom orders.  
Results and Discussion 
We entered world (dream, story), event-type (improbable, impossible, illogical), and age 
(4, 5, 6, 7) as predictors of children’s possibility judgments. We found a main effect of world, 
Wald χ2(1) = 10.27, p = .001, as children judged that more events could happen in a dream than a 
story. We also found a main effect of event-type, Wald χ2(2) = 112.88, p < .001, as children 
judged that more improbable events could happen than impossible or illogical events, ps ≤ .001. 
However, these effects were qualified by an interaction, Wald χ2(2) = 12.89, p = .002; see Figure 
5. For dreams, children judged that more improbable events could happen than impossible or 
illogical events, ps < .001, and that more impossible events could happen than illogical events, p 
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= .001. For stories, children judged that more improbable events could happen than impossible 
and illogical events, ps < .001, but judged that a similar number of impossible and illogical 
events could happen, p = .174.  
Figure 5. Flat violin plot showing the proportion of improbable, impossible, and illogical events 
children judged possible in dreams and stories (Experiment 2). Dots and whiskers show means 
and 95% confidence intervals. 
 
We also found a main effect of age, Wald χ2(3) = 11.47, p = .009, which was qualified by 
an interaction with event-type, Wald χ2(6) = 32.49, p < .001; see Figure 6. These effects had two 
principle causes. First, in comparison to children at all other ages, 7-year-olds more often judged 
that improbable and impossible events could happen, ps ≤ .036. There were no age-related 
differences for these items between younger ages, ps ≥ .105. Second, in comparison with 5-6-
year-olds, 4-year-olds more often judged that illogical events could happen, ps ≤ .042. Their 
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judgments did not differ from those of children aged 7, p = .447. All other effects were non-
significant, ps ≥ .123.  
Single sample tests against chance showed that for dreams, 6- and 7-year-olds mostly 
agreed that improbable events could happen, ps = .001, and 7-year-olds mostly agreed that 
impossible events could happen, p = .008. Also, 5-year-olds mostly disagreed that impossible 
and illogical events could happen, ps ≤ .037, and 6-year-olds mostly disagreed that illogical 
events could happen, p = .004.  
For stories, 7-year-olds mostly agreed that improbable events could happen, ps < .023. 
Also, 4- to 6-year-olds mostly disagreed that impossible events could happen, ps ≤ .001, and 5- 
to 7-year-olds mostly disagreed that illogical events could happen, ps ≤ .022. No other judgments 
differed from chance; see Table 1 for all comparisons.  
These findings show that children do not have general beliefs about what is possible in 
fantastical worlds, and appear to hold more nuanced beliefs about possibility that are specific to 
different worlds.  
Overall, the findings so far suggest that children are most permissible for dreams, and 
least permissible for reality, with judgments about stories falling in between. This conclusion, 
though, relies on combining findings from separate experiments (i.e., Experiment 1 compared 
judgments about reality and dreams, while Experiment 2 compared dreams and stories). We 
therefore conducted a final experiment to see if this pattern in children’s possibility judgments 
would replicate in a single study using a within-subjects design. We also wanted to know 
whether this pattern would generalize to other items. Our first two experiments used items based 
on those from previous investigations of children’s possibility judgments (e.g., Lane et al., 2016; 
Shtulman & Carey, 2007). In our final experiment, we generated new items inspired by common 
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events in dreams (e.g., Honig & Nealis, 2012; Schredl, Ciric, Götz, & Wittmann, 2004) and 
fantasy stories (Thompson, 1958). We tested only 5- and 6-year-olds because their judgments 
about whether impossible events could happen did not differ from those of 4-year-olds in the 
first two experiments (see Figures 4 and 6), and because we did not previously observe any 
interactions between age and world that would lead us to predict a different pattern of results 
across age groups. 
 
Figure 6. Bar plot showing the proportion of improbable, impossible, and illogical events judged 
possible by children at each age. The plot shows children’s judgments collapsed across dreams 




 Participants. We tested 30 5-year-olds (M = 5;5, range = 5;0-5-11, 14 girls) and 30 6-
year-olds (M = 6;5, range = 6;0-6;10, 18 girls).  
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 Materials and procedure. Children were first asked if they were familiar with dreams 
and stories (“Do you know about dreams, like dreams you have when you’re asleep? And do you 
know about stories, like stories in books?”). Children then heard about six physically impossible 
events typical of those encountered in dreams and stories (e.g., meeting a talking squirrel, flying 
through the sky). Children were asked three separate questions about each event, concerning 
whether it could happen in a dream, in a story, or in reality (i.e., 18 judgments in total). Children 
were randomly assigned to hear about events in one of two orders, and answered questions in 
one of three orders. 
 We verified that these events are more dream- and story-like than those used in our 
previous experiments by obtaining judgments from 115 adults via Amazon’s Mechanical Turk, p 
< .001 (see Appendix A). 
Results and Discussion 
We entered world (dream, story, reality) and age (5, 6) as predictors of children’s 
possibility judgments. We found main effects of world, Wald χ2(2) = 98.24, p < .001, and age, 
Wald χ2(1) = 6.13, p = .013, but no interaction, Wald χ2(2) = .46, p = .795; see Figure 7. Children 
thought more events could happen in dreams than in stories or reality, ps ≤ .034, and that more 
events could happen in a story than in reality, p < .001. Also, 6-year-olds were more likely than 
5-year-olds to judge that events could happen in any world, p = .012. 
Single sample tests showed that children at both ages mostly agreed that the events could 
happen in a dream, ps ≤ .019, but could not happen in reality, ps ≤ .001. Also, 6-year-olds mostly 
agreed that the events could happen in a story, p = .002, whereas 5-year-olds’ judgments about 
this did not differ from chance, p = .180. 
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Figure 7. Dual-panel flat violin plot showing the proportion of events judged possible at each 
age for dreams, stories, and reality (Experiment 3). Dots and whiskers show means and 95% 
confidence intervals. 
 
The findings show that children judge that even impossible events can occur in dreams 
and stories when the events are typical of those worlds. We also extend our previous findings by 
again showing that children believe more events to be possible in dreams than in stories, though 
more events are possible in either fantasy world than in reality.  
General Discussion 
 We found that children’s judgments about whether an event is possible depend on 
whether it occurs in a dream, a story, or reality. In Experiment 1, children judged that events 
were more possible in dreams than in reality, though they endorsed the possibility of improbable 
events more than impossible events in both worlds. In Experiment 2, children also judged that 
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events were more possible in dreams than in stories. Finally, in Experiment 3 children often 
judged impossible events to be possible within dreams and stories when the events were more 
typical of those worlds.  
 Our findings extend knowledge of how children conceive of dreams and stories. Earlier 
work examined children’s understanding that dreams and stories are distinct from reality (e.g., 
Woolley, 1995; Woolley & Cox, 2007; also see Woolley & Boerger, 2002), and children’s 
preferences when constructing their own fictional narratives (Sobel & Weisberg, 2014; Weisberg 
& Sobel, 2012). However, to our knowledge, only two studies directly examined children’s 
beliefs about what is possible within the worlds of dreams, and these studies focused primarily 
on anthropomorphic events (Wellman & Estes, 1986; Woolley & Wellman, 1992).  
 We found that children do not apply realistic principles indiscriminately and universally 
when deciding whether events are possible in fantastical worlds. If children only relied on real-
world principles (e.g., causal knowledge), their judgments should have been similar across 
worlds. For instance, children should have denied that a person could have a pet peacock in both 
dreams and stories, as well as in reality. Instead, children were more likely to judge that such 
events could occur in a fantasy world than in reality.  
Further, children distinguished between fantastical worlds, as they judged more events to 
be possible in dreams than in stories. This suggests that children hold nuanced beliefs about each 
world (Skolnick & Bloom, 2006; Weisberg & Bloom, 2009), and that these beliefs influence 
their possibility judgments. For instance, children may view dreams as being more distant from 
reality than stories, leading them to endorse more events as possible in this more distant world 
(Weisberg & Goodstein, 2009). Note that we did not specify the genre of fiction—we only asked 
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about “stories in books”. So children might be as permissive in their judgments for some genres 
of fiction (e.g., fantasy, fairy tales) as they are for dreams (Kibbe, Kreisky, & Weisberg, 2017). 
 Still, the findings of the first two experiments suggest that children show traces of 
realistic thinking even when considering dreams and stories. Though children more often judged 
that any event could occur within dreams and stories, they showed the same graded pattern of 
possibility judgments (e.g., improbable events are more likely to happen than impossible ones) 
that they show in judgments about reality (e.g., Shtulman & Carey, 2007). These consistent 
distinctions between event-types suggest that children carry some of their intuitions about the 
real world into fantastical worlds, and support the suggestion that children’s reasoning about 
fantastical worlds is constrained by their real-world knowledge (Lane et al., 2016). For instance, 
children may use their real-world knowledge as an anchor for whether an event can occur, and 
then adjust their inferences based on their beliefs about each world (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974; 
also see Weisberg & Goodstein, 2009).  
 However, the findings tell a somewhat different story when children considered 
impossible events more typical of dreams and stories. In the final experiment, we found that 
children were more willing to endorse the possibility of impossible events in dreams and stories, 
while also replicating children’s differentiation between the worlds. For instance, children in the 
first experiment were hesitant to endorse that a person could walk through a wall within a dream, 
while children in the final experiment mostly agreed that a person could fly through the sky.  
 Why were children in this final experiment more permissive in their possibility 
judgments? One possibility is that allowing children to judge whether the events could happen 
within all worlds more clearly tapped into their intuitions about the differences between dreams, 
stories, and reality than when they considered only one world. Indeed, the within-subjects design 
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used in previous studies of children’s beliefs about what they can dream and image may have 
contributed to their high rates of agreement towards impossible events (Wellman & Estes, 1986; 
Woolley & Wellman, 1992). 
A more interesting possibility is that children determined whether an event could occur 
by recalling whether they had previously encountered it—or a similar event—in that particular 
world. Beards that grow to the ground and invisible dogs may be rare in dreams and stories, but 
castles made of clouds and talking squirrels are more typical of the events commonly 
encountered in these worlds (see Appendix A). As such, children may have been more familiar 
with the kinds of events used in the final experiment than those from the first experiments, 
leading them to more often endorse the events as possible (also see Woolley, Boerger, & 
Markman, 2004). On this view, children infer possibility by using an availability heuristic 
specific to the world under consideration (Tversky & Kahneman, 1973; Bowman-Smith et al., 
2019).  
This account may seem trivial, as it suggests that children’s beliefs about possibility in 
dreams and stories are largely driven by familiarity. However, this account has important 
implications for how children infer possibility in the real world. Children’s denial that 
improbable events can happen in the real world is widely believed to stem from limits in their 
causal understanding (Schult & Wellman, 1997; Sobel, 2004; Cook & Sobel, 2011; Shutlman & 
Carey, 2007; Shutlman, 2009). For example, children may deny that a person can have a pet 
peacock because they cannot conceive of how one would be acquired or cared for. The present 
findings suggest that mere unfamiliarity also contributes to children’s denials that events are 
possible. The final experiment suggests this by showing that children are likely to endorse the 
possibility of events when the events are typical of a particular world—even if the events are 
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impossible. (Indeed, children may have judged the atypical events of the first two experiments as 
more possible within dreams and stories because of their general familiarity with other strange 
events within these worlds.)  
Returning to children’s judgments about what is possible in the real world, children may 
agree that a person can wear a baseball cap because they have seen this, but deny that a person 
can have a pet lion because they have not. While it remains likely that causal knowledge 
contributes to the consistent age-related increase in children’s judgments that improbable events 
can happen (e.g., Shtulman & Carey, 2007), we contend that the typicality of an event may also 

















Chapter Three: Children judge improbable events possible when they are similar to a 
known event (Paper Two) 
A version of this paper is published: 
Goulding, B. W. & Friedman, O. (2021). A similarity heuristic in children’s possibility 
judgments. Child Development, 92(2), 662-671. https://doi.org/10.1111/cdev.13534 
 
“How many things have been denied one day, only to become realities the next!”  
—Jules Verne, From the Earth to the Moon 
At the turn of the 20th century, a group of French artists produced a series of postcards 
depicting a vision of what France might look like in the year 2000 (Côté et al., 1910). Their 
optimistic predictions included flying firemen equipped with wings, a robotic barber, and a long-
distance communication device that would allow people to see projections of each other. Almost 
all of their predictions rested on the advent of technologies that did not yet exist. Yet a cursory 
glance at the postcards reveals their predictions were fairly limited in scope, and clearly guided 
by new and familiar technologies like gliders, electricity, and the telephone. The artists likely felt 
that since these strange and wonderful technologies had recently fallen into the realm of 
possibility, perhaps similar strange and wonderful things were possible, too. 
Here we explore whether a similar intuition drives children’s beliefs about what is 
possible. Specifically, we test whether their knowledge of what has happened guides their 
inferences about what can happen, and does so even when the circumstances that would enable 
events remain mysterious or unclear. This investigation will help us understand the puzzling yet 
robust finding that children often deny the possibility of improbable events. Drinking onion juice 
and painting polka dots on a plane are strange and uncommon acts, but they are possible 
nonetheless. Yet in contrast with adults, 4- to 8-year-olds often judge these events to be almost as 
impossible as walking through a brick wall or travelling back in time (Shtulman & Carey, 2007). 
This early skepticism towards the possibility of improbable events has been demonstrated across 
35 
 
a variety of events and study designs (e.g., Lane, Ronfard, Francioli, & Harris, 2016; Nolan-
Reyes, Callanan, & Haigh, 2016; Shtulman & Phillips, 2018).  
The similarity heuristic in children’s judgements of possibility 
Children may judge whether events are possible by using a similarity heuristic. When 
hearing about an event or outcome, children may search their memory for instances of similar 
events. If this memory search is successful, children conclude the event can happen. But if the 
search returns no events similar enough to the target event, children may deny that the event is 
possible. For ordinary events and circumstances, similar events should be easy to find. For 
instance, a child who has seen brick houses may also agree that a person could build a house out 
of stones—even if they have never seen or heard about a stone house—simply because both 
events are similar enough that the possibility of one suggests the possibility of the other. For 
improbable events, recalling similar events will be more difficult. After all, improbable events 
are, by nature, exceedingly rare. So, children may deny the possibility of drinking onion juice 
and painting polka dots on a plane because they cannot recall sufficiently similar events.  
The similarity heuristic can be viewed as a variant of the availability heuristic (Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1973) for inferring whether events can occur (Bowman-Smith, Shtulman, & 
Friedman, 2019; Tversky & Kahneman, 1973). It is also consistent with suggestions that 
familiarity underlies children’s possibility judgments, though this has not been directly 
investigated (Shtulman & Carey, 2007; Shtulman, 2009; Woolley & Ghossainy, 2013). 
An important feature of the similarity heuristic is that it allows children to judge whether 
an event is possible without ever considering the circumstances that would enable or prevent its 
occurrence. This contrasts with the assertion that children judge an event to be possible only if 
they can identify circumstances that would allow it to occur (Shtulman & Carey, 2007). For 
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instance, children may dismiss the possibility of drinking onion juice simply because they are 
unable to imagine how such a juice could be made. However, when children are asked to 
generate their own explanations for improbable and impossible events, they often provide 
realistic explanations while still denying that the events are possible (Nancekivell & Friedman, 
2017; Woolley & Cornelius, 2017). So it is unlikely that children rely exclusively on this sort of 
circumstantial reasoning to determine whether improbable events can happen. 
We are not suggesting, though, that children do not use any sort of causal reasoning when 
inferring possibility. Indeed, children consistently reject the possibility of truly impossible events 
(Cook & Sobel, 2011; Lane, Ronfard, & El-Sherif, 2018; Shtulman, 2009), likely by referencing 
their principled knowledge of the world. For instance, children know that solid objects cannot 
float in the air, and animals of one species cannot give birth to offspring of a different species. 
They use knowledge of these principles to conclude that specific events are impossible (Schult & 
Wellman, 1997; Sobel, 2004), and believe that magic would be required to bring about events 
that violate these principles (Johnson & Harris, 1994; Phelps & Woolley, 1994; Rosengren & 
Hickling, 1994; Rosengren, Kalish, Hickling, & Gelman, 1994). We should therefore expect 
children to reject the possibility of impossible events, even if they can recall superficially similar 
events. 
 We investigated the similarity heuristic across three experiments. Experiment 1 compares 
4-6-year-olds’ possibility judgements for improbable events after hearing improbable or ordinary 
facts that are related to the test events. Experiment 2 compares 5-6-year-olds’ possibility 
judgements for improbable events after hearing improbable facts that are related or unrelated to 
the test events. Finally, Experiment 3 compares 5- 6-year-olds’ possibility judgements for both 
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improbable and impossible events after hearing improbable facts that are related to the test 
events.   
Experiment 1 
Method 
Participants. We tested 120 4- to 6-year-olds (M = 5;6 [years;months], range = 4;0-6;11, 
62 girls). In this experiment and the next one, we aimed to test 20 children per age-in-years per 
between-subjects condition, and randomly assigned equal numbers of children at age-each-in-
years to each condition. We determined this sample size as it has sufficed to reveal significant 
effects in past work in this area of research. 
Children were recruited and individually tested at childcare centers and elementary 
schools. Demographics were not formally collected, but most children were from middle-class 
families in the region of Waterloo (Ontario, Canada). Approximately 85% of residents in this 
region are Caucasian, and the largest visible minority groups are of Chinese and South Asian 
descent. All studies received approval from the Office of Research Ethics at the University of 
Waterloo. 
Materials and procedure. In all experiments, children were shown photos on a laptop, with 
accompanying narrations from the experimenter; see Figure 8 for an illustration of the full 
procedure for each experiment. Children completed six trials. In each trial, they heard facts about 
people and were shown a photo demonstrating that the fact was true. Children completed the 
trials in one of two between-subjects conditions. In one condition the facts were improbable, and 
in the other condition they were ordinary. After hearing each fact, children were asked if a 




Figure 8. Sample stimuli and scripts for all experiments, as well as a full list of the facts and 
events used in each. The full set of stimuli can be viewed here. Children in Experiments 1 and 2 
saw a photo related to each test question, whereas children in Experiment 3 saw only a blank 
screen at test. Trials were administered in the order listed, or in the reverse order. For 




that a person could have a pet elephant (improbable) or dog (ordinary) and then asked: “So, 
could a person also have a pet zebra?”  
The similarity account predicts that children who hear improbable facts will judge more 
improbable events to be possible than children who hear ordinary facts, as the mere possibility of 
the improbable facts may suggest that similar improbable events are also possible.  
Results 
 In all experiments, the main analyses used generalized estimating equations models 
(binary logistic) with independent covariance matrices performed using “geepack” for R 
(Halekoh, Højsgaard, & Yan, 2006); any post-hoc pairwise comparisons were performed using 
the “emmeans” package for R (Lenth, Singmann, Love, Buerkner, & Herve, 2019). Figure 9 
shows the proportion of events judged possible by children in all experiments. The data for all 
experiments can be found here. 
We entered fact-type (improbable, ordinary) and age-in-months (mean-centered) as 
predictors of children’s judgements about whether improbable events were possible. We found a 
main effect of fact-type, Wald χ2(1) = 9.59, p = .002, and a main effect of age, Wald χ2(1) = 
13.65, p = .002, but these effects were qualified by an interaction, Wald χ2(1) = 6.43, p = .011. 
We explored this interaction by analyzing the effect of age separately for each fact-type. At all 
ages, children made similar judgements about whether improbable events were possible after 
hearing improbable facts, Wald χ2(1) = 0.01, p = .931, but were less likely with age to agree that 
improbable events were possible after hearing ordinary facts, Wald χ2(1) = 13.65, p < .001. We 
then analyzed the effect of fact-type separately for each age group (4-year-olds, 5-year-olds, 6-
year-olds). Both 5- and 6-year-olds more often agreed that improbable events could happen after 
hearing improbable facts than after hearing ordinary facts, Wald χ2(1) = 4.78, p = .029 and Wald 
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χ2(1) = 12.30, p < .001, but this effect was absent in 4-year-olds’ judgments, Wald χ2(1) = 0.00, p 
> 0.999. 
Consistent with use of the similarity heuristic, 5-6-year-olds were more likely to endorse 
the possibility of improbable events if they heard about similar improbable facts than if they 
heard about related ordinary facts. However, 4-year-olds were similarly willing to endorse the 
possibility of an improbable event after hearing any fact. Their results are surprising given that 
younger children are often especially hesitant to endorse the possibility of improbable events 
(e.g., Shtulman & Carey, 2007).  
Use of the similarity heuristic should lead children to judge whether events are possible 
by asking themselves if they know about similar events. Hence, they should affirm the possibility 
of improbable events more often if they learn about related improbable events than unrelated 
improbable events. Our next experiment tested this prediction in 5-6-year-olds.  We did not test 
4-year-olds because Experiment 1 suggested their possibility judgments were not influenced by 
knowledge of similar or dissimilar events. 
 
Figure 9. Scatterplots with trendlines showing proportion of events judged possible by each 
child as a function of their age in months in all experiments. Bands show 95% confidence 





Participants. We tested 80 5 and 6-year-olds (M = 6:0, range = 5;0-6;11, 38 girls). One 
additional child did not respond to our questions was therefore replaced. 
Materials and procedure. Children completed six trials in one of two between-subjects 
conditions; see Figure 8. In each trial, they heard improbable facts about people and were shown 
a photo demonstrating that the fact was true. In one condition, they were then asked about the 
possibility of a related improbable event. For example, children were told and shown that a 
person could have a pet elephant and then asked: “So, could a person also have a pet zebra?” 
This condition served as a replication of the improbable-fact condition from Experiment 1. In the 
other condition, they were instead asked about the possibility of an unrelated improbable event. 
This condition featured the same facts and events as the related-event condition, but with the 
pairings shuffled so that the facts were no longer related to the succeeding events. For example, 
children were told and shown that a person could have a pet elephant and then asked: “So, could 
a person also have a polka dot plane?”. A consequence of simply rearranging the items from 
Experiment 1 is that children would inevitably judge the possibility of events related to facts 
presented in previous trials. We therefore blocked the items such that children’s first three 
judgments were unrelated to the presented facts, whereas their final three judgments were related 
to facts presented in the first three trials. 
The similarity account predicts that children who hear related facts will judge more 
improbable events to be possible than children who hear unrelated facts, as only facts that are 
sufficiently related to the improbable events should be informative about their possibility. 
Crucially, this difference should be more apparent in children’s first three possibility judgments, 
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as their last three judgments will be informed by previously presented facts regardless of whether 
they saw related or unrelated fact-event pairings. Conversely, if children are simply affirming 
improbable events as possible after hearing any other improbable event, we should find no 
difference between the influence of related and unrelated facts.  
Results 
 We entered relation (related, unrelated), item-block (first three trials, last three trials), and 
age-in-months (mean-centered) as predictors of children’s judgements about whether improbable 
events were possible. There was a main effect of relation, Wald χ2(1) = 15.18, p <. 001, as 
children more often affirmed that improbable events could happen after hearing related rather 
than unrelated facts. There was also a main effect of item-block, Wald χ2(1) = 28.75, p  <.001, as 
children more often affirmed that improbable events could happen in the last block than in the 
first block. However, these main effects were qualified by an interaction, Wald χ2(1) = 17.04, p 
<.001. There was no main effect of age, Wald χ2(1) = 0.01, p = .923, and age did not interact 
with any other factor, ps ≥ .180.  
 We next analyzed the effect of relation separately within each item-block. For the first 
item-block, there was a main effect of relation, Wald χ2(1) = 14.86, p <.001, as children who 
heard about related facts and events were more likely to say that the events were possible than 
children who heard about unrelated facts and events. This effect was not observed in the last 
item-block, Wald χ2(1) = 0.04, p = .849, as children’s judgments did not differ across related and 
unrelated fact-event pairings.   
 In sum, children were more likely to affirm that improbable events could happen after 
hearing about related improbable events than after hearing about unrelated ones. This shows that 
children consider their knowledge of what has happened to be informative about the possibility 
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of sufficiently similar events, but not other unrelated events. In our final experiment, we test 
whether children’s use of the similarity heuristic is constrained by deeper principles about what 
is impossible. We do this by asking children about improbable and impossible events that are 
both related to a given fact. 
Experiment 3 
Method 
Participants. We tested 50 5-6-year-olds (M = 6;1, range = 5;0-6;11, 23 girls). We 
aimed to test 20 children per age, but inadvertently tested an additional 10 6-year-olds. All 
children are included in our analyses. 
Materials and procedure. In four trials, children heard improbable facts and were 
shown a photo demonstrating that each fact was true. After hearing each fact, all children were 
asked whether two related events were also possible. One of the events was improbable, and the 
other was impossible. For example, children were told and shown that a person has a pet 
elephant and then heard: “OK, now I have some questions for you. Could a person also have a 
pet zebra? Could a person also have a pet unicorn?".  
Results 
 We entered event-type (improbable, impossible) and age-in-months (mean-centered) as 
predictors of children’s judgements about whether the events were possible. We found a main 
effect of event-type, Wald χ2(1) = 29.92, p < .001, as children more often affirmed that 
improbable events could happen than impossible events. There was no main effect of age, Wald 
χ2(1) = 2.55, p = .110, but there was an interaction between age and event-type, Wald χ2(1) = 
5.51, p = .019. We explored this by analyzing the effect of event-type separately for each age 
group (5-year-olds, 6-year-olds). The effect of event-type remained significant for both age 
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groups, but the effect was larger in 6-year-olds, p < .001, OR = 0.08, than in 5-year-olds, p < 
.001, OR = 0.20.  These findings show that children more often affirmed the possibility of 
improbable rather than impossible events despite both events being related to a learned fact.  
General Discussion 
 Children judged that improbable events could happen when they were told that similar 
events had occurred. In Experiment 1, telling children about improbable events made 5-6-year-
olds, but not 4-year-olds, likely to judge that similar improbable events could also happen. In 
Experiment 2, 5-6-year-olds were more likely to affirm that improbable events could happen if 
told about related improbable events than if told about unrelated ones. Finally, in Experiment 3, 
children affirmed the possibility of improbable events, but not impossible ones, after hearing 
about related improbable events. These results are the first to reveal a manipulation leading 
young children to affirm that improbable events can happen in real life. Recent experiments 
investigated other manipulations that attenuated children’s denials to a degree (Bowman-Smith 
et al., 2019; Lane et al., 2018), but without shifting children from denying to affirming that 
improbable events could happen. 
These findings suggest that 5- to 6-year-olds use the similarity heuristic to judge whether 
events are possible. This is consistent with the suggestion that children often reject the possibility 
of improbable events because the events are too dissimilar from children’s own experiences 
(Shtulman & Carey, 2007; Woolley & Ghossainy, 2013). Our experiments offer the first direct 
support for this account. Importantly, though, children did not endorse the possibility of 
impossible events, even after being told about similar improbable events. This shows that besides 
considering similarity, children’s judgments were constrained by awareness of deeper principles 
making certain outcomes impossible (Schult & Wellman, 1997; Sobel, 2004). 
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 Crucially, we did not provide children with information about the circumstances or causal 
principles that would have allowed any of the events to occur. For example, we did not tell them 
how a person could acquire or accommodate a pet elephant. Children therefore had no new 
causal information to deploy when inferring the possibility of the target impossible events, like 
having a pet zebra. So our findings are not explained by the suggestion that children infer 
possibility by identifying circumstances that would allow an event to occur (Shtulman, 2009; 
Shtulman & Carey, 2007). On this view, knowledge that an improbable event can happen should 
have little influence on children’s beliefs about possibility in the absence of further information 
about how the event could have arisen. Our findings contrast with this view, but also do not 
provide evidence against this account as a strategy for inferring possibility 
 Nevertheless, the similarity account may help explain findings that are not readily 
explained by exclusively causal explanations of possibility judgements. For example, it may 
better explain why children view improbable events as more possible in distant countries than at 
home, as they may know that their memories are less informative about what might happen in 
placed that are unfamiliar to them (Bowman-Smith et al., 2019). Further, while Shtulman and 
Carey (2007) found participants of all ages to be equally unfamiliar with their set of improbable 
events, Shtulman (2009) used a larger and more diverse set of improbable events and found that 
participants became more likely with age to both encounter the events and to judge them as 
possible. While these results are mixed, the latter is consistent with our finding that mere 
exposure to improbable events can lead children to judge that other improbable events can 
happen.   
Two related questions raised by our findings are whether the similarity heuristic is also 
used by children younger than age 5, and whether its use remains later in development. 
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Regarding earlier in development, we found that 4-year-olds were similarly willing to endorse 
the possibility of an improbable event after hearing any fact, which is surprising given that 
younger children are often more hesitant than older children to endorse the possibility of 
improbable events (e.g., Lane et al., 2016; Shtulman & Carey, 2007). It is therefore possible that 
the 4-year-olds in our experiments somehow felt pressured to affirm, rather than deny, the 
possibility of events. However, a different manipulation might show that 4-year-olds, like older 
children, compare potential events to known events to determine their plausibility. Regarding 
later development, it might seem that adults should not use the similarity heuristic, perhaps 
because they have greater knowledge of the causal circumstances that would allow events to 
occur (Shtulman & Carey, 2007). However, it is likely that adults use it when they have limited 
knowledge about how or why an event can happen. For instance, adults judge it is possible to 
stay awake for 5 days, but not for 5 months (Shtulman, 2009). But it is unlikely that most adults 
know enough about the biological basis of sleep to understand why the less extreme event could 
happen, while the more extreme one could not. Instead, it could be that they have heard about 
people staying awake for several days (an outcome similar to 5 days) but have never heard of 
anyone staying awake for months. The similarity heuristic, then, may not just be for children. It 








Chapter Four: Limits in causal knowledge do not explain children’s possibility judgments 
(Paper Three) 
A version of this paper has been invited for revision: 
Goulding, B.W. & Friedman, O. (invited revision). Limits in causal knowledge do not explain 
children’s possibility judgments. Child Development. 
 
Making an eggplant-onion smoothie would be strange and unusual, but most adults 
would probably agree it is possible. Adults typically view unusual and improbable events, like 
having a pet lion or eating pickle-flavored ice-cream, to be almost as possible as everyday events 
like wearing a hat or washing a car. The same cannot be said for young children, who often deny 
that improbable events can happen. Indeed, 4-year-olds often view these events as being almost 
as impossible as truly impossible events, like walking on water or growing money on a tree 
(Shtulman & Carey, 2007). The finding that 4- to 8-year-old children are skeptical of the 
possibility of improbable events has proven remarkably robust (Danovich & Lane, 2020; Lane et 
al., 2018; Shtulman, 2009; Shtulman & Phillips, 2018; Weisberg & Sobel, 2012). So, despite the 
relative simplicity of making an eggplant-onion smoothie, a young child would probably say that 
it cannot be done. But the reasons behind children’s denial of improbable events remains 
mysterious.  
 Limits in children’s causal knowledge might explain why they deny that unusual events 
can happen. People may infer an event’s possibility by imagining the causal circumstances that 
would allow it to occur; if they fail to imagine how an event could happen, they reject its 
possibility (Shtulman & Carey, 2007; also see Cook & Sobel, 2011; Lane et al., 2016; Shtulman, 
2009). On this view, children might reject the possibility of having a pet lion or eating pickle-
flavored ice-cream because they are unaware of how these events could arise. For instance, 
children may think all pets come from pet stores. If they know that pet stores do not sell lions, 
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they might conclude lions are unattainable as pets. Conversely, adults might know that exotic 
pets can be imported, and therefore decide that a person could have a pet lion if they really 
wanted. This causal-circumstances account has been proposed in numerous studies of children’s 
reasoning about possibility.  
Some support for this “causal circumstance” account is provided by the development of 
children’s and adults’ explanations of their possibility judgments. When explaining why an event 
can or cannot happen, such as a person living without a heart, 4- to 9-year-olds usually offer 
hypothetical explanations (e.g., “You would die in five minutes”) or redundant explanations 
(“It’s impossible”; Shtulman, 2009). However, adults usually give factual explanations (e.g., 
“You need a heart to pump blood”). Further, adults who judge that events are possible often 
explain their reasoning by referring to circumstances that would enable the events, whereas 
adults who deny events often refer to causal principles that the events violate (Shtulman & Tong, 
2013). Together these findings suggest that people are more likely to see an event as possible if 
they can identify circumstances that would enable it.  
 To our knowledge, no study has directly tested this casual-circumstances account, and 
children’s beliefs about possibility can be difficult to reconcile with it. For instance, while 5- to 
6-year-olds are usually reluctant to endorse the possibility of improbable events, they will often 
agree that a person could have a pet zebra if they first learn that a person has a pet elephant, and 
agree that a person could wear a costume to work if they learn that a person worked in their 
pajamas (Goulding & Friedman, 2021). This finding suggests that factors other than causal 
knowledge underlie children’s denials that improbable events can happen. For instance, they may 
be better explained by a memory-based heuristic in which children judge an event’s possibility 
via its similarity to a known event. Children may say that an event is possible if they can recall 
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an instance of the event happening, or if they can recall the occurrence of an event that is similar 
to the event at hand (Woolley & Ghossainy, 2013). While the evidence for this memory-based 
account is also limited, these findings call into question whether gaps in children’s causal 
knowledge lead them to deny that events can happen. 
However, children’s causal knowledge doubtlessly impacts their beliefs about possibility. 
Despite their frequent denial that improbable events can happen, children are even more likely to 
deny that impossible events can happen (e.g., Bowman-Smith et al., 2019; Shutlman, 2009; Lane 
et al., 2018). This is likely because truly impossible events directly violate children’s principled 
real-world knowledge (Schult & Wellman, 1997; Sobel, 2004). For instance, a person walking 
through a brick wall is unequivocally impossible if solid objects cannot pass through each 
other—and even infants seem to understand this (see Baillargeon et al., 2011). Children are also 
adept at learning causal relations that allow them to see “possibilities” (see Gopnik and Shultz, 
2004). For instance, blicket-detection tasks show that even 2-year-olds can determine which 
objects will and will not cause a novel toy to function (Gopnik et al., 2001). Crucially, though, 
such uses of causal knowledge cannot explain children’s denials that improbable events can 
happen, as improbable events are possible and therefore unlikely to violate children’s principled 
knowledge. The claim that gaps in children’s causal knowledge leads them to deny events can 
happen (i.e., the causal-circumstances account) is distinct from the observation that children can 
use principled knowledge to determine whether many other events are impossible. 
 Here, we provide a straightforward test of the causal-circumstances account. We explore 
whether children will more often agree that an improbable event is possible when they know of 
circumstances that would allow it to occur. We do this by giving children detailed causal 
knowledge about how a normal event could arise; for instance, we explain how a juicer works, 
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and how it can be used to make apple juice. We then probe their beliefs about whether a person 
could have a related improbable item, such as cauliflower juice. Crucially, the causal information 
provided is broad and detailed enough that it could be applied to attain a variety of outcomes 
(i.e., children who learn how to make apple juice also learn how juice, in general, can be made). 
The key question is whether this new knowledge will lead them to accept outcomes that are 
strange and improbable. To test this manipulation, Experiment 1 compares 4- to 7-year-old’s 
possibility judgments for ordinary, improbable, and impossible events after hearing causal or 
noncausal information about a related item. 
We also explore whether children’s beliefs about improbable events are more impacted 
by learning causal information about related improbable events than related ordinary events. For 
instance, we tell children how to make either a strawberry- or pickle-flavored popsicle, providing 
identical causal information for both events, before asking whether a person could also have an 
onion-flavored popsicle. We also include a third condition in which children are merely told that 
improbable events happened. Comparing across these three conditions allows us to determine 
whether causal information has any influence on children’s beliefs over-and-above the influence 
of a memory-based similarity heuristic (Goulding & Friedman, 2021). Experiment 2 explores 
these manipulations in 5- and 6-year-olds. 
Experiment 1 
Method 
Participants. We tested 240 4- to 7-year-olds (M = 5;11 [years;months], range = 4;0-
7;11, 108 girls). We tested 30 children per age-in-years per between-subjects condition, and 
randomly assigned equal numbers of children at each age-in-years to each condition. We 
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determined this sample size as it has sufficed to reveal significant effects in past work in this area 
of research (e.g., Bowman-Smith et al., 2019; Goulding & Friedman, 2021; Lane et al., 2018). 
Children were recruited and individually tested at childcare centers and elementary 
schools. Demographics were not formally collected, but most children were from middle-class 
families in the region of Waterloo (Ontario, Canada). Approximately 85% of residents in this 
region are Caucasian, and the largest visible minority groups are of Chinese and South Asian 
descent. All studies received approval from the Office of Research Ethics at the University of 
Waterloo. 
Materials and procedure. Children were shown photos on a laptop, with accompanying 
narrations from the experimenter; see Figure 10 for an illustration of the full procedure and 
script. In each of three trials, children were told that a person had a normal item (strawberry ice-
cream, normal-shaped house, apple juice). Children were randomly assigned to one of two 
between-subjects conditions: causal-information and noncausal-information. Children in the 
causal-information condition heard about how each item can be made; for instance: “You can 
make apple juice with a juicer. To use a juicer, you put stuff in it and it squeezes out all the 
liquid so you can pour it into a glass and drink it. So, if you put apples in it, you’ll have apple 
juice.” Children in the noncausal-information condition heard about where the items can be 
found; for instance: “You can get apple juice in lots of places. You can get apple juice at the 
grocery store. You can get apple juice at a restaurant. And, you can get apple juice at 
somebody’s house.” After hearing about each item, children were asked if a person could also 
have a related normal item, improbable item, and impossible item (e.g., orange juice, cauliflower 
juice, rock juice).  We asked about these items in one of three orders, and question order varied 





In both experiments, the main analyses used generalized estimating equations (GEE) 
models (binary logistic) with independent covariance matrices performed using the “geeglm” 
function for “geepack” for R (Halekoh et al., 2006). These analyses were subsequently passed 
through the “joint_tests” function for the “emmeans” package to produce an omnibus test; any 
post-hoc pairwise comparisons were also performed using the “emmeans” package (Length et 
al., 2019). Trendlines in each figure show predicted values and 95% confidence intervals, and 
were produced by passing each GEE model through the “ggemmeans” function for the 
“ggeffects” package (Lüdecke, 2018). The materials and data for all experiments can be found 
here. 
We entered condition (between-subjects: causal-information, noncausal-information), 
item-type (within-subjects: ordinary, improbable, impossible) and age-in-months (mean-
centered) as predictors of children’s judgments about whether events could happen. This 
revealed a main effect of item-type, F (2) = 241.37, p < .001. Children affirmed ordinary events 
more often than improbable events, p < .001, OR = .025, and impossible events, p < .001, OR = 
.005, and affirmed improbable events more often than impossible events, p < .001, OR = .183. 
The main effect of condition was not significant, F (1) = 0.07, p = .787, nor was the main effect 
of age, F (1) = 3.79, p = .052. There was a significant interaction between item-type and age, F 
(2) = 19.52, p < .001. Children were more likely with age to affirm ordinary events, p < .001, but 
less likely with age to endorse improbable or impossible events, ps ≤ .002. There were no other 





    
Figure 10. Procedure and results from Experiment 1, with sample images and scripts for one full 
trial. Trendlines are shown for predicted judgments within each item-type; bands show 95% 
confidence intervals. Points show the proportion of events judged possible by each participant; 
the points are jittered slightly to decrease overplotting. 
 
We also performed single-sample tests against chance for responses within each question 
and age-in-years. All children in both conditions affirmed that ordinary events could happen, ps 
<.001, and denied that improbable and impossible events could happen, ps <.009.  
 The findings suggest that children’s denial of unusual events do not stem from limits in 
their causal knowledge. We told children about circumstances that could enable ordinary events 
and asked whether related improbable events were possible, and compared their responses to 
those of children who instead heard non-causal information about the events. Children’s 
responses did not differ across the two conditions. Moreover, children were more likely to deny 
the possibility of these events with age. These findings contrast with previously observed age-
related increases in affirming improbable events, and with the suggestion that this developmental 
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trend is driven by a likewise increase in knowledge of causal circumstances (Shutlman & Carey, 
2007; Shtulman, 2009).  
 One concern, though, is that the information provided in this experiment was not detailed 
or clear enough to influence children’s beliefs. For instance, children learned that a juicer could 
make apple juice, but they did not learn how it could do so (i.e., by crushing and grinding food) 
and they did not see a depiction of this happening. This shallow understanding may have left 
children unsure about which other events could arise from the same circumstances, whereas a 
deeper understanding of the causal mechanisms at work may have increased their confidence in 
the possibility of other outcomes. However, we know that children’s beliefs about the possibility 
of improbable events can be altered after hearing only the minimal information that a related 
improbable event has happened (Goulding & Friedman, 2021).  
We therefore conducted a second experiment with three aims. The first was to provide 
even more detailed causal information to strengthen the effect of our original manipulation. The 
second was to contrast the relative influence of causal information with that of knowing that a 
related event has happened (i.e., a memory-based similarity heuristic). The third was to explore 
whether children’s beliefs about improbable events are more impacted by learning causal 
information about related improbable events than related ordinary events. We provided children 
with identical detailed causal information about either ordinary or improbable events, and then 
asked them if related improbable events were also possible. We also included a third condition in 
which we merely told children that improbable events happened.  
Experiment 2 
The design and analysis plans for Experiment 2 were preregistered at aspredicted.org and 
can be found here. We followed the preregistration in all regards except the number of 
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observations collected, as our lab abruptly ceased all in-person testing in response to the 2020 
COVID-19 pandemic. 
Method 
 Participants. We tested 109 5-6-year-olds (M = 6;0, range = 5;0-6;11, 46 girls). As in 
the first experiment, we aimed to test 30 children per age-in-years per between-subjects 
condition. However, we were unable to collect our full intended sample before ending data 
collection. 
Materials and procedure. Children were shown a Qualtrics survey administered via an 
Amazon Fire tablet. The experimenter entered children’s responses by touching hidden regions 
of the screen corresponding to yes/no judgments on each test slide. In all conditions, children 
responded to the same six test questions and answered two questions per trial. Children were 
presented with each item-and-question set one-at-a-time, and did not hear about the next set until 
after responding to both test questions. Assignment to each between-subjects condition, trial 
order, and question order were fully randomized by Qualtrics. See Figure 11 for an illustration of 
the full procedure and script. 
Children were randomly assigned to one of three between-subjects conditions. In the 
ordinary causal-information condition, children were introduced to three ordinary items 
(strawberry-flavored popsicle, normal-shaped house, apple-juice) and saw a photo of each item. 
They then heard detailed information about how the items could be made. This information was 
delivered in three steps, and each step was accompanied by a relevant photo. After hearing about 
each item, children were asked if a person could also have a related improbable item and a 
related impossible item (e.g., cauliflower juice, rock juice).  This condition was similar to the 
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causal condition from Experiment 1, but was intended to make the causal information more 
detailed and clear. 
In the improbable similarity-information condition, children were instead introduced to 
three improbable items (pickle-flavored popsicle, shoe-shaped house, broccoli juice) and shown 
a photo of each item. Children were then immediately asked if a person could also have a related 
improbable and impossible item; they did not hear any information about the circumstances that 
enabled the events. This manipulation has been shown to increase children’s beliefs about the 
possibility of improbable events (Goulding & Friedman, 2021), so including it here allows us to 
see whether children can be led to view these improbable events as possible. It also allows us to 
compare the effect of causal knowledge with children’s use of a memory-based similarity 
heuristic. 
In the improbable causal-information condition, children were introduced to the same 
three improbable items. The procedure thereafter was otherwise identical to the normal-causal 
condition; the step-by-step information, accompanying photos, and test questions were the same. 
Subtle changes in wording were required to match the improbable item under consideration (i.e., 
the experimenter said “pickle-flavored popsicle” instead of “strawberry-flavored popsicle”). We 
included this condition because the ordinary causal-information and similarity-information 
conditions differ in respect to both the item being learned about and the type of information 
provided, so comparing them directly would not allow us to determine which of these differences 
is driving any observed effects. By instead comparing children’s responses in these two 
conditions with those of children in the improbable causal-information condition, we will be able 
to tease apart the role of causal information from the influence of knowing that a similar 
improbable event happened. At the same time, this condition allows us to explore whether 
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children’s beliefs about improbable events are more impacted by learning causal information 
about related improbable events than related ordinary events. 
Results 
 The abrupt cessation of data collection for this experiment, combined with Qualtrics’ 
fully random assignment of children to each between-subjects condition, resulted in unequal 
numbers of children in each condition in our final data set. Our analysis includes 37 children in 
the ordinary causal-information condition, 28 participants in the improbable causal-information 
condition, and 44 participants in the improbable noncausal-information condition. 
 We first conducted an analysis with condition (between-subjects: ordinary causal-
information, improbable causal-information, improbable similarity-information), item-type 
(within-subjects: improbable, impossible), and age-in-months (centered) as predictors. This 
revealed a main effect of condition, F (2) = 8.07, p < .001, which we expand on below. It also 
revealed a main effect of item-type, F (1) = 70.02, p < .001, as children more often affirmed 
improbable events than impossible events. The effect of age was not significant, F (1)  = 2.83, p 
= .093, nor were any interactions, ps ≥ .115. 
 We next performed pairwise comparisons to follow-up on the main effect of condition. 
Children more often affirmed improbable and impossible events if they heard causal information 
about related improbable events than if they heard identical causal information about related 
ordinary events, p < .001, OR = 9.04. Children’s responses did not differ depending on whether 
they heard how improbable events happened or merely learned that they occurred, p = .053, OR 
= 2.31. As specified in our pre-registration, we did not compare judgments across the ordinary 




Figure 11. Procedure and results for all three conditions in Experiment 2, with sample images 
and scripts for one full trial. Trendlines are shown for predicted judgments within each item-
type; bands show 95% confidence intervals. Points show the proportion of events judged 
possible by each participant; the points are jittered slightly to decrease overplotting. 
 
We also ran single-sample tests against chance (i.e., 0.5) to determine children’s overall 
pattern of endorsement across conditions and item-types. Children in the ordinary causal-
information condition denied improbable and impossible events, ps < .001, whereas children in 
the improbable causal-information condition affirmed improbable events but denied impossible 
ones, ps < .001. Children in the improbable similarity-information were ambivalent about 
improbable events, p = .794, but denied impossible ones, p < .001. 
Given our lack of power to detect significant interactions, we also performed two 
additional omnibus analyses: one compared responses within the two causal conditions (ordinary 
causal-information, improbable causal-information), and one compared responses within the two 
improbable conditions (improbable causal-information, improbable noncausal-information). 
These analyses confirmed that children’s agreement was higher after hearing causal information 
about improbable events than ordinary events. In contrast with our primary analysis, they also 
revealed that children agreed significantly more after hearing causal information about an 
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improbable event than merely hearing that the improbable event happened, p = .044. The results 
of these analyses are included in Appendix B.  
General Discussion 
 In two experiments we examined why children deny that improbable events can happen. 
In Experiment 1, we told 4- to 7-year-olds causal and noncausal information about ordinary 
events and asked whether related ordinary, improbable, and impossible events could also occur. 
Children’s judgments were comparable across both conditions, and they continued to deny that 
improbable and impossible events could happen. In Experiment 2, we compared the role of 
detailed causal information with the influence of knowledge that a similar improbable event 
already happened. Detailed causal information about ordinary events did not lead 5- and 6-year-
olds to affirm improbable events as possible, and they more often affirmed events as possible 
when they simply knew that a similar improbable event occurred. However, children may have 
been most likely to affirm improbable events if they knew how a similar improbable event 
happened. 
 The findings suggest that knowledge of causal circumstances alone is not sufficient to 
alter children’s beliefs about possibility. The circumstances that enabled the ordinary events used 
here were designed to be general enough to apply to many outcomes; for instance, the process 
for making of pickle-flavored popsicles could enable the creation of almost any popsicle. But 
children still adamantly rejected the possibility of improbable events that could plausibly arise 
from these circumstances. Their rates of denial did not differ from those of children who heard 
noncausal information, and were comparable to (or even lower than) children’s baseline 
possibility judgments from previous studies (e.g., Goulding & Friedman, 2020; Lane et al., 2018; 
Shtulman & Carey, 2007). So, while children and adults often explain whether events are 
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possible by referencing circumstances that would enable them (e.g., Shtulman, 2009), providing 
this information to children did not impact their beliefs. In sum, the findings suggest that 
children’s denial of improbable events is not fully due to limitations in their causal knowledge. 
One possibility is that the information provided here was not detailed enough to lead 
children to envision new possibilities. We attempted to address this concern by providing more 
detailed, stepwise information in the second experiment, with pictures showing exactly how each 
process led to its outcome. But there is a great deal more information that children must know to 
make educated guesses about the possibility of other outcomes, and we cannot be certain that the 
children in our experiments had this prerequisite knowledge. For instance, to fully understand 
how popsicles are made, they must know that most food can be pulverized into a liquid and 
frozen, and to fully understand how houses are made, they must understand that its shape is not 
the key feature that makes it structurally sound and inhabitable. These events therefore require 
comprehension of other knowledge that 4- to 7-year-olds might not yet grasp. However, we think 
this concern is unlikely to account for most of our findings. Children gain knowledge throughout 
childhood (see Shtulman, 2017), yet children in our experiments either became less likely with 
age to affirm improbable events or showed no effect of age. If a lack of knowledge is driving 
these effects, we should have seen the opposite: children should have become more likely with 
age to infer the possibility of improbable events. 
Further, we found that we could impact children’s beliefs about possibility by providing 
them with minimal information: children more often judged improbable events to be possible 
when they learned the mere fact that a similar improbable event had already occurred. This is in 
line with children’s use of a memory-based similarity heuristic for inferring possibility, in which 
children’s knowledge of what has happened directly guides their inferences about what can 
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happen (Goulding & Friedman, 2021; Woolley & Ghossainy, 2013). This similarity heuristic 
might also underlie children's tendency to view social norms and conventions as laws that cannot 
be violated or changed (e.g., Browne & Woolley, 2004; Chernyak et al., 2013; Kalish, 1998; 
Komatsu & Galotti, 1986; Levy et al., 1995; Lockhart et al., 1977; Miller et al., 2000). Crucially, 
we also found that this effect emerged regardless of whether children also learned how the 
similar event occurred, suggesting that the similar event had a stronger impact on children’s 
beliefs than the detailed causal information that accompanied it. These results show that 
children’s beliefs about the improbable events used here are not immutable. But why does 
minimalistic knowledge of similar events lead children to make richer inferences about 
possibility, while more detailed information about causal circumstances does not? 
One explanation is that children use similarity in deciding when to extend and apply their 
causal knowledge. For instance, if children view strawberry and onion-flavored popsicles as 
fundamentally dissimilar, they may be skeptical that the process that enabled one could also 
enable the other. But if children know for certain that a pickle-flavored popsicle can be made, 
and view this event as similar to making a onion-flavored popsicle, they may infer that the 
circumstances that enabled the first event could likely enable the similar event—even if they do 
not know what those circumstances are. In this sense, knowledge of similar events may serve as 
a proxy for knowledge of causal circumstances. Our supplemental analyses of children’s 
responses in the second experiment suggest this, as children were somewhat more likely to infer 
that improbable events could happen if they also knew how a similar event occurred (see 
Appendix B).2 Here, the influence of causal knowledge seemed to stack with children’s use of 
 
2 This result is compelling but should be interpreted with caution. The supplemental analyses for Experiment 2 
revealed a difference between the improbable-causal and improbable-similar conditions, but the main analysis did 
not. We suspect that our smaller-than-intended sample size reduced our power to detect this interaction, but cannot 
be certain it would have reached significance in the full sample. 
62 
 
the similarity heuristic, suggesting that children infer that similar events share similar 
circumstances. 
 These findings align with the importance of similarity in promoting children’s analogical 
reasoning. Children more often transfer knowledge to novel situations and problems if they 
perceive similarities between prior events and the situation at hand. Indeed, young children are 
especially likely to transfer knowledge if situations are similar on the surface, and can struggle 
with transferring knowledge between situations that only share deeper commonalities (Chen, 
1996; Chen & Klahr, 2008). For instance, children are better at reenacting moralistic stories with 
toys if they can use the toys from the original story rather than novel toys, even if the events and 
moral lesson remain exactly the same (Gentner & Toupin, 1986). But children’s difficulty in 
transferring knowledge can be lessened if situations are framed as being similar to one another 
(Holyoak et al., 1984), or if children are asked to detect similarities themselves (Brown, 1988). 
Here, we found that these same considerations factor into children’s judgments about possibility. 
Children more often view events as possible if they know that superficially similar events have 
happened. Further, they may only extend causal knowledge to events that share surface 
similarities with known events.  
We close by considering the implications of our findings for the causal-circumstances 
account of possibility judgment (Shtulman & Carey, 2007). The present experiments suggest that 
knowledge of causal circumstances either has no effect on children’s beliefs about whether 
improbable events are possible, or only influences their beliefs about events that are similar to 
known events. The findings also show that the mere knowledge that an event can happen has a 
robust influence on children’s beliefs about the possibility of similar events both with and 
without further information about how the events could occur. Taken together, this work 
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suggests that knowledge of causal circumstances may only impact children’s beliefs about 
possibility after they are able to draw connections between potential events and known events. It 
is therefore unlikely that increased knowledge of causal circumstances alone drives the striking 
developmental difference between children and adults’ beliefs about possibility. Instead, adults 
may be more adept than children at perceiving similarities between events, and may be less 
distracted by superficial differences between structurally similar events. They can also retrieve 
more events from memory than young children, and therefore have a larger bank of events to 
which they can draw connections. These differences may suffice to explain why adults affirm the 












Chapter Five: General Discussion 
Major Findings 
 Across eight experiments, I found evidence that children’s beliefs about possibility are 
shaped by knowledge of what has happened, and that this might matter more than knowing how 
events could happen.  
Chapter Two explored whether children’s beliefs about possibility differed between 
dreams, stories, and reality, and whether their beliefs about fantasy were constrained by their 
real-world intuitions. In two experiments, I found that 4- to 7-year-olds believed more things to 
be possible in dreams and stories than in reality, and that children held nuanced beliefs about 
these different kinds of fantastical worlds. But I also found that children still distinguished 
between the possibility of improbable and impossible events in each fantastical world, 
suggesting that their beliefs about these worlds are anchored in their real-world intuitions. In a 
third and final experiment, I found evidence that children use what they know to be typical of 
these worlds when inferring whether events can happen within them. Whereas children in the 
first two experiments were largely skeptical of both improbable and impossible events, children 
in the final experiment affirmed truly impossible events that were dream- and story-like. For 
example, children in Experiment 2 were ambivalent about whether a person in a story could have 
a pet peacock or grow a beard to the ground, and mostly denied that a person in a story could 
walk through a wall or grow money on a tree. While there is no a priori reason to expect that 
these events should not belong in a story, they were borrowed from previous work on children’s 
possibility judgments and were not necessarily similar to the kinds of events usually included in 
stories. In contrast, children in Experiment 3 mostly affirmed that a person in a story could meet 
a talking squirrel, ride a magic bicycle, and fly through the sky. These were items designed to be 
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significantly more akin to storybook events that children might be familiar with. Together, the 
findings suggest that children’s possibility judgments are driven by both familiarity and real-
world constraints. 
Chapter Three directly investigated whether children use a memory-based similarity 
heuristic to infer possibility. In Experiment 1, I found that telling 4.5- to 6-year-olds improbable 
facts led them to affirm that similar improbable events were possible. Experiment 2 expanded on 
this by demonstrating that similarity really seems to matter, as children more often affirmed 
improbable events to be possible after learning related rather than unrelated improbable facts. 
Finally, Experiment 3 found that children would affirm similar improbable events, but not 
similar impossible events. This shows that their judgments cannot entirely be explained by the 
similarity heuristic, and that their beliefs are constrained by knowledge of principles that render 
certain outcomes impossible. 
Chapter Four addressed the alternative account: that children reason about possibility by 
identifying causal circumstances that would allow an event to occur. In Experiment 1, I provided 
4- to 7-year-olds with either causal or noncausal information about how ordinary events could 
happen. Here, I wanted to determine if this kind of causal knowledge would enable them to 
entertain the possibility of other, more improbable, outcomes. However, their responses did not 
differ as a function of the information provided, and children persisted in denying the possibility 
of improbable events. In Experiment 2, I replicated this finding with more detailed, stepwise 
causal information. I also explored the relative influence of causal and similarity information by 
telling 5- and 6-year-olds how an improbable event could occur, compared to simply telling 
them that a similar improbable event happened. These findings were less clear. While both kinds 
of information about improbable events led to greater levels of agreement compared to ordinary 
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causal information, I also found weak evidence that these kinds of information might stack in 
influence. That is: children might be most likely to affirm that events are possible if they know 
that a similar event has happened and how it could occur.  
Together, these findings suggest that our beliefs about possibility are largely driven by 
our familiarity with, and memory of, past events. They provide the first evidence for a similarity 
heuristic in children’s possibility judgments. They also suggest that knowledge of causal 
circumstances may play a much weaker role in children’s beliefs about possibility than has been 
suggested (Lane et al., 2016; Shtulman & Carey, 2007), though their beliefs are constrained in 
other important ways. In the following section, I further contextualize my findings in light of 
these two accounts. I also explore how information about similar events might work to reshape 
children’s beliefs about possibility, and potential factors that might constrain this process. 
The causal-circumstances and similarity accounts, revisited 
 In the introduction, I outlined two potential accounts for inferring possibility. One 
account posited that people might reason about possibility by identifying causal circumstances 
that would enable events to occur. On this view, adults affirm improbable events because they 
can envision how they could happen, and children deny improbable events because they cannot. 
This has remained a popular account for explaining the development of possibility inferences 
(e.g., Shtulman, 2009; Shutlman & Carey, 2007; Lane et al., 2016). However, many of my 
findings are difficult to reconcile with this view. 
 The most direct evidence against this account comes from Chapter 4. I tested whether 
providing children with causal information that could potentially enable improbable events 
would lead them to affirm the events as possible. However, children persisted in denying the 
events, and making the information more detailed did not change this. This finding alone casts 
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significant doubt on the causal circumstances account, at least in its simplest form. If children 
usually deny improbable events because they cannot think of circumstances that could enable 
them, then the information provided throughout these experiments should have at least partially 
remedied this issue. Indeed, it was only when causal information was paired with information 
about a similar event that children’s judgments shifted towards affirmation. This suggests that 
causal information might matter for possibility judgments in some circumstances, but in isolation 
is not sufficient to impact children’s beliefs about possibility. 
 It is also difficult to explain children’s beliefs about dreams and stories with a solely 
causal account of possibility judgments. Previous work has suggested that children are reality-
bound when reasoning about fantasy and imagination, and that this might be because their beliefs 
are largely driven by real-world causal knowledge (see Harris, 2021). But I found that children 
judged more events possible in dreams and stories than in reality, and that they viewed 
impossible dream- and story-like events as fully possible in both worlds. If children were using 
their real-world causal knowledge to reason about possibility in these worlds, then they should 
have mostly denied both improbable and impossible events, and their beliefs should have closely 
mirrored reality. Instead, children held nuanced beliefs about possibility for each of these worlds, 
suggesting that other factors were driving their beliefs. 
 I also proposed an alternative account for inferring possibility, where people search their 
memories for similar events that they know to have happened when judging whether an event is 
possible. Chapters 3 and 4 offer direct support for this similarity account, as I found that children 
were more likely to judge improbable events possible after being told that a similar event had 
already occurred. Importantly, none of my manipulations offered children any information about 
how these events might occur. This suggests that merely knowing that a strange and unlikely 
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event has happened is enough to shift children’s beliefs about the possibility of other, yet-
unfamiliar events. 
 This similarity account can also help us explain children’s judgments for dreams and 
stories, which I examined in Chapter 2. When asked to judge the possibility of events that were 
atypical of dreams and stories, such as a person having a pet peacock or walking through a wall, 
I found that children were somewhat skeptical about whether these events could happen in either 
of these worlds. However, when I instead asked about typical dream and story events, such as 
flying through the sky or meeting a talking animal, I found high rates of affirmation. This finding 
suggests that children may have searched their memories for events they knew had already 
occurred in dreams and stories, and used these memories to guide their inferences about 
possibility. When the events were similar, they affirmed them; when they were dissimilar, they 
were skeptical. This finding further suggests that children’s use of the similarity heuristic may be 
sensitive to the context in which events are embedded, and that their memory searches for events 
may be guided by the situations and environments they are asked to consider (also see Bowman-
Smith et al., 2019). 
 As a reminder, there is no reason to expect these accounts to be mutually exclusive. In 
fact, some of my findings suggest that both may be true, at least in part. In Chapter 4, I provided 
children with information about how improbable events could occur, which led children to 
mostly affirm that similar improbable events could happen. But children who merely heard that 
an improbable event occurred, without hearing additional causal information, were ambivalent 
about these same events. These results should be interpreted with caution, as I was unable to 
collect my full intended sample before ending data collection. However, they suggest that causal 
information and knowledge of similar events may stack in influence, such that children are most 
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likely to affirm an event as possible if they have both kinds of knowledge at hand. Children may 
therefore use similarity to guide their extensions of causal knowledge, and may expect similar 
events to arise from similar circumstances. On this view, knowledge of causal circumstances is 
important, but children may not know how to apply this knowledge if they do not see a 
connection between the event in question and what they know. The similarity heuristic may 
provide this connection. 
 I also obtained findings that neither account can neatly explain. For instance, in Chapter 3 
I found that children judged more events possible in dreams and stories than in reality, but also 
consistently differentiated between improbable and impossible events in each fantastical world. 
This finding is especially puzzling. Children’s beliefs about these worlds mirror reality more 
than they really ought to, given that dreams and stories are not obviously constrained in any 
meaningful way. Yet children still thought more things were possible in these worlds, meaning 
they saw these worlds as less constrained than reality, if not entirely unrestricted. How can we 
explain their judgments? One possibility is that children employed an entirely different heuristic 
here: anchoring and adjustment (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). Children may have taken their 
baseline beliefs about how possible the events were in reality, and adjusted them according to 
their intuitions about how much “more possible” events should be in each fantastical world. This 
would explain their higher affirmations for events in these worlds, as well as their preservation of 
the distinction between improbable and impossible events. My findings cannot verify whether 
this account is true, nor can they identify the source of children’s differing intuitions for each 
kind of world (but see Weisberg & Goodstein, 2009, for a discussion of how children might 
reason about deviant worlds). However, this finding further suggests a potential role of heuristics 
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in possibility judgment, and highlights that the two accounts offered here cannot offer us a full 
picture of how people reason about possibility. 
How does similarity shape beliefs about possibility? 
 Across three series of experiments, I found evidence for a similarity heuristic in 
children’s possibility judgments. However, my findings do not address how similar events work 
to alter children’s beliefs about possibility. They also cannot speak to how adults and children 
decide whether two events are similar enough that the possibility of one implies the possibility of 
the other. The most straightforward account is that children simply decide whether a potential 
event is similar to something they know and judge it possible without further consideration. But 
similarity-based judgments may instead reflect richer inferences about implied causal 
mechanisms and the structure of categories. Below, I outline two accounts for how knowledge of 
similar events might reshape children’s beliefs about possibility. I also discuss how a 
developmental shift in identifying similarities between events might help explain the 
development of possibility judgments. 
 Similarity as a proxy for causality. Knowledge of similar events might serve as a proxy 
for causal knowledge. In other words, people might infer that two sufficiently similar events 
should be able to arise from the same circumstances. Further, they may make this assumption 
despite knowing little about what those circumstances are. For instance, imagine you were told 
that it was now possible to remotely hijack and drive cars using only a cellphone. You might 
begin to worry that all manner of vehicles and household appliances are now liable to be 
compromised, despite knowing nothing about the specifics of this exploit and how it works. You 
might just assume that the technology that enabled the first event could probably enable similar 
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ones. On this view, knowledge of similar events serves to suggest enabling circumstances 
without explicitly identifying them.  
This is much like the popular “placeholder” account of psychological essentialism, where 
surface similarities between things are taken to signal more fundamental constraints that bind 
them together in a deeper, nonobvious sense (Gelman, 2004; Medin & Ortony, 1989; Strevens, 
2000). For instance, we might view geese and robins as similar and decide that they share a 
hidden essence that determines their bird-ness, despite knowing nothing about the physical or 
biological mechanisms that underly this perceived similarity. Here, the nonobvious “constraints” 
that bind superficially similar events together are the causal circumstances that may have enabled 
them. This explanation partially reconciles the causal-circumstances and similarity accounts, as it 
proposes that knowledge of similar events may enable children and adults to identify enabling 
causal circumstances.  
 This account makes two important predictions. First, it predicts that people should be less 
likely to affirm the possibility of thematically similar events that could not arise from the same 
circumstances. For instance, learning about hacked cars might lead a person to affirm the 
hackability of boats, but probably not the hackability of bicycles. All these events are 
thematically similar in that they involve remotely commandeering a vehicle, but bicycles are 
non-electric and therefore cannot be commandeered under the same circumstances. Further, 
bicycles may usually be seen as more similar to cars than boats, since cars and bicycles enable 
urban transport whereas boats do not, but less similar in this hacking situation given the electrical 
requirements. This suggests that inferences about shared causality may shift people’s perceptions 
about the similarity between two events when inferring whether they are both possible. These 
points may seem trivial, but a non-causal explanation for the similarity-based possibility 
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judgments would not necessarily predict these distinctions, and none of my data so far indicate 
whether they are clearly present in children’s judgments.  
Second, this account predicts that providing people with more detailed causal knowledge 
should augment the influence that similarity has over their judgments of possibility. For instance, 
learning that the hack works via radio signal should decrease the number of similar events seen 
as possible since not all vehicles have radios. Conversely, learning that the hack operates via any 
electrical signal should make more events seem possible. In this sense, this account is 
functionally a hybrid between the causal-circumstances and similarity accounts, as it proposes 
that both knowledge of causal circumstances and similar events should factor into judgments of 
possibility. My findings from Chapter 4 offers some support for this view, as a combination of 
enabling causal knowledge and information about a similar event had the greatest positive 
impact on children’s possibility judgments for improbable events. However, more work is 
needed to directly test these assumptions. 
 Similar events may restructure categories. Alternatively, knowledge of similar events 
might serve to influence people’s categorical knowledge. This category-knowledge account rests 
on the suggestion that improbable events are often denied because they are viewed as category 
errors, rather than being seen as strictly impossible. For instance, consider whether a pet lion 
could be viewed as a pet. You might reasonably deny this suggestion because lions do not meet 
some essential criteria of “pets”, despite also knowing that a person could acquire one. For 
instance, you might see lions as extremely dangerous, wholly untameable, and pragmatically 
difficult to house without building an entirely separate outdoor enclosure, which disqualifies 
them from being a true “pet” in your eyes. Children’s possibility judgments may also operate in 
this way: children may deny that an event is “possible” because they perceive it to violate some 
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core categorical assumption, or because the event lacks superficial features that would usually 
indicate category membership. For instance, they may believe that a zebra cannot be considered 
a pet, that pajamas cannot be considered work attire, and that a liquid made from onions cannot 
be considered a juice. Previous work suggests that children often reject category members that 
lack characteristic features of a category, despite also having a defining feature that should allow 
for its membership. For example, they might deny that a castle with swimming pools and 
delicious food could be a “prison”, despite also knowing that the residents can never leave (Keil 
& Batterman, 1984). However, no work has addressed whether this pattern of reasoning 
intersects with children’s possibility judgments. 
 On this view, informing children about similar events may serve to challenge, and 
therefore broaden, their beliefs about the kinds of things that are considered acceptable category 
members. This category-knowledge account predicts that any atypical category member may 
become a “possible” candidate, irrespective of whether the events themselves might arise from 
similar circumstances. For instance, learning that a person could have a pet elephant may lead 
children to question their knowledge of what a “pet” can be, and may lead them to accept new 
members that they would have previously dismissed, such as a pet zebra. But it may also lead 
them to affirm less-related candidates as well, such as a pet jellyfish or a pet penguin, despite 
these events requiring vastly different enabling circumstances. Elephants and zebras are large 
and difficult to house, jelly-fish can simply be placed in an aquarium, and penguins require a 
frozen environment to live in—and even more differences become apparent if you also consider 
where you would find these animals, how you might reasonably bring them to your home. This is 
in contrast to the previously discussed hybrid account, which proposes that beliefs about 
similarity and possibility are constrained by inferences about shared causality. On this view, any 
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consideration of whether the events could be enabled in the same way might disqualify jellyfish 
and penguins as possible pets, since it is unlikely that they can accommodated in the same way 
as elephants and zebras.  
Previous work on children’s category learning has found that a single exposure to a new 
category member (e.g., caterpillars) leads them to extend membership to perceptually similar 
items (e.g., ropes), whereas exposure to multiple category members leads them to infer that 
membership should only be given to items sharing deeper, less obvious similarities (e.g., snakes, 
turtles; Gentner & Namy, 1999). If children’s possibility judgments proceed in a similar manner, 
we might also expect them to be most accepting of new events after learning a single improbable 
fact, and more restrictive in their inferences if confronted with multiple improbable facts with 
deeper commonalities—for instance, shared causality. For example, learning about a pet elephant 
may lead children to broadly accept improbable pets (e.g., zebra, jellyfish, penguins), whereas 
learning about a pet elephant and pet rhinoceros might cause them to narrow their inferences to a 
smaller, more similar set of candidates (e.g., zebra, giraffe, hippopotamus). Exploring the 
breadth and kind of events that children are willing to consider after learning improbable facts 
should allow us to tease apart these two accounts for inferring possibility.  
 Seeing similarity. Regardless of how the similarity heuristic works, we might expect that 
adults affirm more events as possible than children because they have a larger knowledge base 
and can therefore retrieve more similar events from memory. However, the developmental shift 
in possibility judgments may also be driven by a greater ability among adults to construe events 
as similar in a meaningful way. As discussed in Chapter 4, children primarily attend to 
superficial features when determining whether two things are similar or dissimilar, and often 
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struggle to perceive deeper similarities (Chen, 1996; Chen & Klahr, 2008; Gentner & Toupin, 
1986).  
But affirming improbable events as possible may often require noticing deeper 
similarities between two superficially dissimilar events. For instance, apples and onions might 
seem dissimilar on the surface, and children might be tempted to dismiss the possibility of onion 
juice on these grounds alone. But apples and onions are both fleshy foods with a high moisture 
content, they are both often peeled before they are cooked or eaten, they both caramelize when 
heated, and they both rot when left in the sun. A person who notices these similarities might 
conclude that apples and onions are indeed similar, and might infer that onion juice is a 
possibility given that apple juice exists. Adults might spontaneously make these connections 
more often than children, which may help explain why they see so many more events as possible. 
One way to test this would be to point out these kinds of similarities to children before asking 
them to make possibility judgments. Indeed, previous work has shown that children’s analogical 
reasoning is improved when deeper similarities are highlighted (Holyoak et al., 1984), so this 
seems like a promising manipulation for exploring possibility judgments as well. 
Possibility, atypicality, and inductive reasoning 
 One final point to consider is whether children’s possibility judgments stem from a more 
general pattern in their reasoning: children often dismiss any notion that appears atypical or 
counterintuitive. This bias against the atypical appears in judgments of category membership 
(Keil & Batterman, 1984), beliefs about moral violations (Shtulman & Phillips, 2018) and social 
norms (Cimpian & Salomon, 2014; Komatsu & Galotti, 1986), beliefs about fantasy worlds 
(Weisberg et al., 2013), and their predictions about their future selves (Bélanger et al., 2014). To 
illustrate: children judge that a garbage bag cannot be a dress (Keil & Batterman, 1984), that a 
76 
 
person could not clean their room by shovelling clothes under their bed (Shtulman & Phillips, 
2018), that school buses could not be any colour other than yellow (Cimpian & Salomon, 2014), 
that fantastic stories should contain ordinary events (Weisberg et al., 2013), and that they will 
prefer sippy cups to coffee mugs when they grow older (Bélanger et al., 2014). What these 
findings have in common is that they show children rejecting possibilities that are dissimilar 
from what they know. This is the same general finding we observe in children’s possibility 
judgments. 
 Rather than representing converging yet distinct findings, it seems likely that children’s 
reasoning in each of these areas—possibility included—stem from common cognitive 
mechanisms or processes. One possibility is that all of these judgments are largely driven by 
features of inductive reasoning. Indeed, many of the explanations for children’s possibility 
judgments raised here are echoed by Hayes and Heit (2018) in a discussion of how children and 
adults may reach conclusions from given premises:  
“In many cases, domain experts prefer to make inductive inferences based on their deeper 
knowledge of causal and ecological relations between premise and conclusion categories 
rather than on general heuristics such as typicality and diversity. Notably, violations of 
the standard induction phenomena among experts are only found for stimuli that lie 
within the domain of expertise. Fish experts, for example, used causal knowledge to 
generalize a novel disease property (“has a disease called sarca”) but used taxonomic 
similarity to generalize a novel blank property (“has a property called sarca”) (Shafto & 
Coley, 2003).” 
 
 Here, the authors are suggesting that naïve inductive inferences may be driven by 
similarity, whereas inferences about well-known and familiar categories may be driven by 
deeper knowledge of the non-obvious properties and principles that bind members together. The 
same could certainly be true for possibility judgments. My findings show that children affirm 
events as possible if they simply know that something similar has happened, though they 
consistently reject truly impossible events that violate their real-world causal knowledge. Also, 
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adults often affirm events that seem superficially possible, such as travelling the Milky Way or 
performing a brain transplant (Shtulman & Tong, 2013), but they might be considerably more 
skeptical about these events if they knew more about the circumstances that would be required to 
enable them. It therefore seems plausible that the mechanisms that allow us to perform inductive 
inference are similar to those that allow us to distinguish between the possible and impossible. 
Further, we may find that these mechanisms are involved whenever we are asked to consider 
events and outcomes that deviate from premises that are familiar to us. Future work should aim 
to establish how judgments across these varying domains diverge and develop, as we may 
discover that many of our beliefs about our social, moral, and physical reality are often explained 
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Appendix A: Adult Ratings of Impossible Events from Chapter 2 
In Experiment 3 we sought to ask children about impossible events that are more dream 
and story-like than those used in our first two experiments (whose items were closely based on 
those from previous studies of children’s possibility judgments). To test whether our items were 
more dream and story-like, we sought adults’ impressions of both kinds of items.  
Participants. We recruited 115 American adults via Amazon Mechanical Turk (mean 
age = 33.7, SD = 9.73). We excluded 37 additional participants because they failed to respond 
appropriately to two catch questions.  
Materials and Procedure. Participants read instructions informing them that they would 
read about different impossible events, and were asked to rate “the extent to which each is 
typical of the impossible events that happen in stories and dreams”. Below these instructions 
were 12 test sentences, and participants rated each on a 5 point scale ranging from “Extremely” 
to “Not at all”; the intermediate options on the scale were not labelled.  
Six of the test sentences were the impossible items from Experiment 3 intended to be 
dream/story-like. The other six test sentences were those from Experiments 1 and 2 (four items), 
or from Shtulman & Carey (2007; two items: car vanishing into thin air, drinking lightening 
juice). We added these items so that there would be six items in each set.  
The list also included two “catch” items, which instructed participants to give particular 
responses, e.g., “Having a helicopter made of jello (regardless of how you feel, please score this 





Results and Discussion  
The complete data are available here. Participants rated the six impossible items from 
Experiment 3 (M = 3.49) as more dream/story-like than the other six items (M = 2.95), paired-
samples t-test, t(114) = 8.93, p < .001, and as more dream/story-like than just the 4 items from 
Experiments 1 and 2 (M = 3.06), t(114) = 7.78, p < .001.  
These findings suggest that the items from Experiment 3 were more typical of dreams 



















Appendix B: Supplemental Analyses from Chapter 4 
Comparison between causal conditions 
The analysis included condition (between-subjects: ordinary causal-information, 
improbable causal-information), item-type (within-subjects: improbable, impossible), and age-in-
months (centered). This revealed a main effect of condition, F (1) = 14.59, p < .001, as children 
more often agreed that a person could have improbable and impossible items if they heard causal 
information about how to make related improbable items than if they heard identical causal 
information about making ordinary items. There was also a main effect of item-type, F (1) = 
38.29, p < .001, as children more often agreed that a person could have improbable items than 
impossible items.  
There was a marginal effect of age, F (1) = 3.74, p = .053, but this effect was further 
qualified by a marginal interaction with information-type, F (1) = 3.45, p = .063. We explored 
this by analyzing the effect of age separately for each condition. Children’s responses in the 
ordinary causal-information condition did not change as a function of age, F (1) = 0.00, p = .999. 
However, agreement among children in the improbable causal-information condition increased 
significantly with age, F (1) = 5.90, p = .015. No other interactions were significant, ps ≥ .139.  
Comparison between improbable conditions 
The analysis included condition (between-subjects: improbable causal-information, 
improbable similarity-information, item-type (within-subjects: improbable, impossible), and age-
in-months (centered). There was a main effect of condition, F (1) = 4.06, p = .044, as children 
were more likely to agree that a person could have both kinds of items when provided with 
causal information. There was a main effect of item-type, F (1) = 87.33, p < .001, as children 
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more often agreed that a person could have improbable items than impossible items. Children’s 
agreement also increased with age, F (1) = 3.88, p = .049. 
There was a marginal interaction between condition and age, F (1) = 3.42, p = .064, 
which was explored by analyzing the effect of age separate for each condition. Children’s 
responses in the improbable similarity-information condition did not change as a function of age, 
F (1) = 0.15, p = .694. However, agreement among children in the improbable causal-
information condition increased significantly with age, F (1) = 5.90, p = .015.  
There was also a marginal interaction between item-type and age, which was explored by 
analyzing the effect of item-type separate for each age-group. Agreement towards improbable 
items was higher than agreement towards impossible items in each age group, though this effect 
was larger among 6-year-olds, p < .001, OR = .0169, than among 5-year-olds, p < .001, OR = 
.199.  
No other interactions were significant, ps ≥ .106.  
 
 
 
